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Abstract—Traditionally, (nonmasking and masking) fault-
tolerance has focused on ensuring that after the occurrence of
faults, the program recovers to states from where it continues
to satisfy its original specification. However, a problem with this
limited notion is that, in some cases, it may be impossible to
recover to states from where the entire original specification
is satisfied. For this reason, one can consider a fault-tolerant
graceful-degradation program that ensures that upon the occur-
rence of faults, the program recovers to states from where a
(given) subset of its specification is satisfied. Typically, the subset
of specification satisfied thus would be the critical/important
requirements.
In this paper, we initially focus on automatically revising a
given fault-intolerant program into a fault-tolerant gracefully
degrading program. Specifically, we propose a two-step approach:
In the first step, we transform the fault-intolerant program into
a graceful program. This program is guaranteed to satisfy only
the given subset of specification (e.g., critical requirements). In
particular, this step involves adding new behaviors that will sat-
isfy the given subset of the specification. The second step involves
utilizing the original program and the graceful program to obtain
a fault-tolerant gracefully degrading program. We also develop
an algorithm to transform the gracefully degrading program
into a distributed gracefully degrading program. Afterwards, the
second phase of our transformation can be applied to generate
a distributed fault-tolerant gracefully degrading program. We
showcase the algorithm with three different non-trivial case
studies. Finally, we formalize the problem of multi-graceful
degradation and propose an algorithm that solves it and we use
a complex case study to showcase the viability of the approach.
All the algorithms have polynomial time complexity in the size
of the state space of the original program.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are increasingly dependent on highly available com-
puter systems to provide fully functional and stable services.
However, these programs are often subjected to new types
of faults that are not considered in the original design. This
may occur, for example, due to changing user requirements or
due to deployment of the program in a new environment. It is
especially important that the addition of such fault-tolerance be
done correctly, i.e., the addition indeed provides the required
resilience and preserves the original functionality.
Some of the existing approaches for automated addition of
fault-tolerance include [1]–[3], where three different levels of
fault-tolerance, namely nonmasking, masking and stabilizing,
are considered. The common requirement for these levels
of tolerance can be succinctly described with Figure 1(a),
where S denotes the states where the program operates in
the absence of faults and T denotes the states where the
program may operate in the presence of faults. Fault-tolerance
requires that if the program is perturbed to a state in T then
it recovers to a state in S so that the subsequent behavior
satisfies the program specification. (Masking fault-tolerance
has an additional requirement that recovery from T to S must
be safe whereas stabilizing fault-tolerance has an additional
requirement that T must include all possible states.)
However, one limitation of these approaches is that in many
scenarios, it is impossible for the program to recover to the
original program behavior after faults occur, i.e., it may be
impossible for the program to recover to states in S. In
such scenarios, it is desirable that the program recovers to an
acceptable state (cf. S′ in Figure 1(b)) from where it satisfies
some gracefully degraded behavior, i.e., behavior that is close
to its original behavior.
The goal of this work is to develop algorithms where we
begin with a program that satisfies its specification in the
absence of faults (while being in states in S) and the desired
relaxed specification in the presence of faults. The goal of the
algorithm is to first identify a suitable S′ and then construct
a fault-tolerant program that (1) preserves the specification in
the absence of faults and (2) recovers to states in S′ after the
occurrence of faults from where it satisfies the given relaxed
specification.
To illustrate this goal further, consider a canonical example
of a graceful behavior program where the original program
provides core services and auxiliary services. However, after
recovery, the program guarantees core services. In this context,
the goal of the algorithm would be to begin with a program
that satisfies the original specification in the absence of faults
and desired requirements in the presence of faults (critical
requirements) and construct a program that will (1) satisfy
both critical and auxiliary requirements in the absence of faults
and (2) provide recovery to states where it satisfies critical
requirements.
The idea of such graceful degradation has been introduced
in [4], where authors consider the specification to consist of
a set of n properties. Subsequently, they consider desirable
subsets (which are typically much less than 2n subsets) of
these n properties. To further illustrate the application of
graceful degradation, we use the printer example considered in
[4]. A printer system consists of computers sending printing
tasks to a collection of printers. The tasks are organized in
a queue and each printer executes a transaction in which it
dequeues only one task and then prints it. In an ideal scenario
(S in Figure 1) , one may prefer FIFO order for print requests,
i.e., the task that is dequeued first is printed first. Thus, in
an ideal setting, the specification requires that at most one
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Fig. 1: Relationship between addition of graceful degradation and addition of fault-tolerant graceful degradation
dequeue operation can occur at a time. And, the next dequeue
operation occurs only after the current task is printed.
For the sake of discussion, assume that in the presence of
faults such as network delays or computer crashes, it may
not be possible to guarantee that the program can recover to
states from where this specification would be satisfied. Hence,
one possible weaker specification (considered in [4]) is to
allow a limited out-of-order printing. For example, one simple
specification is that Task n is printed only after Task n− 2 is
printed although Task n may be printed before Task n− 1.
In this example, the original program provides FIFO order
for print requests. The desired fault-tolerant graceful degra-
dation program has the following properties. In the absence
of faults (states S in Figure 1), the program provides FIFO
ordering. However, if faults occur then the program recovers
to states (S′ in Figure 1) from where it satisfies the degraded
(weaker) specification (i.e., limited out-of-order printing).
One of the difficulties in generating the fault-tolerant pro-
gram that provides graceful degradation lies in the fact that the
input does not contain a program that satisfies the weaker spec-
ification (i.e., a program that satisfies out-of-order printing).
Asking the designer to specify such a program is undesirable,
since it increases the overhead for the designer. With this
motivation, our approach for adding fault-tolerant graceful-
degradation consists of two steps. The first step (Figure 2)
focuses on the automated addition of graceful degradation to
the fault-intolerant program in the absence of faults.
In particular, this step begins with a program, say p, that
satisfies the original specification (FIFO order for the printer
example) and constructs a program, say pg , that satisfies the
weaker, degraded specification (limited out-of-order printing).
The program pg is obtained by adding new behaviors to
p, outside of S but within S′ (e.g., to provide out-of-order
printing in the printer example). Thus, in the case of the printer
example, the generated program will provide FIFO behavior
from the original states as well as limited out-of-order printing
from additional states.
In the second step (Figure 3), we begin with program p and
pg to construct a fault-tolerant gracefully degrading program
pf . Program pf ensures that in the absence of faults, it behaves
like p and, hence, it will satisfy the original specification in the
absence of faults. Moreover, if faults occur then pf recovers
to states from where pg satisfies the degraded specification.
Depending upon what pf does during the recovery process,
we can get different variations. For example, one variation
can be similar to masking fault-tolerance where some safety
properties are satisfied during the recovery process. Another
variation can be similar to stabilizing fault-tolerance where
recovery must be provided from an arbitrary state. 1
Subsequently, we extend the problem of fault-tolerant grace-
ful degradation to address the problem of fault-tolerant multi-
graceful degradation. Intuitively, fault-tolerant multi-graceful
degradation allows a hierarchy of severe faults and require
that the program satisfy corresponding hierarchy of weaker
specifications. After formalizing the problem of addition of
fault-tolerant multi-graceful degradation to a program, we
provide an algorithm, based on the two-step approach, that
solves the problem. We illustrate the working of the algorithm
through a detailed case study associated with Ohio Coal
Research Center (OCRC).
Contributions of the paper. The contributions of the paper
are as follows:
− We define the problem of automated addition of graceful
degradation and present a polynomial-time algorithm
in the size of the state space of the fault-intolerant
program to solve it. Unlike previous algorithms [5] that
focus on removing behaviors in the absence of faults,
this algorithm focuses on adding new behaviors while
ensuring that these behaviors still satisfy the weaker
specification.
− We provide an algorithm that transforms a graceful
program into a distributed graceful program.
− We adapt existing algorithms for adding fault-tolerance
to design fault-tolerant graceful degradation.
− We illustrate our algorithm with three case studies,
namely (i) the printer system, (ii) resource constraint
problem motivated by channel assignment in cellular
networks and (iii) the classic byzantine agreement prob-
lem.
− We extend the problem of adding graceful fault-tolerance
1Note that these variations are not the same as masking and/or stabilizing
tolerance since pf may not satisfy its original specification after recovery is
complete. Moreover, if we utilize existing algorithms [5] where the input
consists of program p then those algorithms will declare failure to add
masking fault-tolerance if it is impossible to guarantee recovery to behaviors
of program p.
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to the case where we have a hierarchy of increasingly
severe faults and we need to satisfy decreasing level of
specification in their presence. For this purpose, we de-
fine the problem of automated addition of fault-tolerant
multi-graceful degradation and present a polynomial-
time algorithm, based on the two-step approach, with
complexity in the size of the state space of the fault-
intolerant program to solve it.
− We illustrate the multi-graceful degradation addition
algorithm through a detailed case study of the Ohio Coal
Research Center (OCRC) [6].
Organization of Paper. The rest of paper is organized as
follows: We define the notion of program, specification and
specification relaxation in Section II. In Section III, we
formally state the problem of automated generation of the
graceful program. In Section IV, we present the algorithm
to generate the graceful program from the original program
and the specification (original and relaxed). In Section V, we
present two case studies to demonstrate the graceful program
generation step by step. In Section VI, we discuss how to
extend the algorithm for generating graceful programs to dis-
tributed programs. In Section VII, we use byzantine agreement
as an example to further illustrate the technique of generating
graceful distributed programs. In Section VIII, we define
the problem of adding fault-tolerant graceful degradation and
continue with the three case studies to add fault-tolerance to
the programs generated in Sections V and VII. We then present
and formalize the problem of automated addition of multi-
graceful degradation in Section IX and present a polynomial-
time algorithm that solves it. To show the working of the
multi-graceful degradation addition algorithm, we present the
OCRC system in detail in Section X, present a model of the
system and then show the application of the multi-graceful
degradation algorithm to the OCRC system. Finally, we dis-
cuss related work in Section XI and provide further insights
and a summarize the paper in Section XII, where we also
provide insights of our ongoing work.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section, we give formal definitions of programs,
program specifications, and graceful degradation. The program
is specified in terms of its state space and transitions. The
definition of specification is adapted from [7]. The notion of
graceful degradation is adapted from [4].
A. Program
A program p, specified as a tuple 〈Sp, δp〉, consists of its
finite state space Sp and transitions δp, where δp ⊆ Sp × Sp.
A state predicate of p is any subset of Sp. A state predicate
S is closed in p (respectively, δp) iff (∀(s0, s1) ∈ δp : (s0 ∈
S ⇒ s1 ∈ S)). A sequence of states, 〈s0, s1, · · ·〉 (denoted by
σ), is a computation of p iff(1) ∀j : 0 < j < length(σ) :
(sj−1, sj) ∈ δp, and (2) if σ is finite and terminates in state sl
then there does not exist state s such that (sl, s) ∈ δp. In other
words, in each step of the computation of p, some transition
of p is executed. And, the computation is finite iff p does not
have any transition in the final state.
The projection of program p on state predicate S, denoted
as p|S is the program 〈Sp, {(s0, s1) ∈ δp ∧ s0, s1 ∈ S}〉. In
other words, p|S includes transitions of p that begin and end
in S.
Notation. If the context is clear, we use p and δp (transitions
of p) interchangeably. Also, we say that a state predicate S is
true in state s iff s ∈ S.
B. Program Syntax
To model the state space and transitions concisely, we use
processes, variables (associated with a finite domain) and
actions. The state space Sp of p is obtained by assigning
each variable a value from its respective domain. Thus, the use
of variables allows us to represent the state space compactly.
Additionally, to compactly represent δp, we use actions of the
form: guard −→ statement where guard is a constraint
(predicate) involving program variables and statement up-
dates program variables [8]. We denote variable x of a process
j by x.j. An action guard −→ statement denotes the set of
transitions {(s0, s1) : guard is true in s0 and s1 is obtained
by changing s0 as prescribed by statement}. We use x(s)
to denote the value of variable x in state s. This compact
representation has been used in several past works to represent
distributed algorithms, e.g., [8].
As an example, consider a triple modular redundancy
(TMR) system, with three inputs x, y and z to the voter and
an output out from the voter. One action of the TMR system
is as follows:
out = ⊥ ∧ x = y = z → out := x
This action basically states that when all three inputs are the
same, the voter chooses one of them as output. To further
4illustrate that an action provides a concise representation of
transitions, consider the domain of x, y and z to be {0, 1} and
out is defined over {0, 1,⊥}, where ⊥ denotes an undefined
value. The state space of the TMR program will contain 24
states. The above action will represent the following set of
transitions:
{(s, t)| ((x(s) = y(s) = z(s) = 0 ∧ out(s) = ⊥)∧
(x(t) = y(t) = z(t) = 0 ∧ out(t) = 0))
∨
((x(s) = y(s) = z(s) = 1 ∧ out(s) = ⊥)∧
(x(t) = y(t) = z(t) = 1 ∧ out(t) = 1))
}.
C. Specification
Following Alpern and Schneider [7], we let the specification
of program consist of a safety specification and a liveness
specification. The safety specification is specified in terms of
a set of bad states, say specbs, that program is not allowed to
reach, and a set of bad transitions, specbt, that the program is
not allowed to execute. Thus, a sequence 〈s0, s1, · · ·〉 (denoted
by σ) satisfies the safety specification iff (1) ∀j : 0 ≤ j <
length(σ) : sj 6∈ specbs, and (2) ∀j : 0 < j < length(σ) :
(sj−1, sj) 6∈ specbt.
The liveness specification, on the other hand, denotes “good
thing” happens during program execution. We use leadsto
property (L  T ) to denote liveness specification, where both
L and T are state predicates. Thus, a sequence 〈s0, s1, · · ·〉
(denoted by σ) satisfies the liveness specification iff ∀j : (L
is true in sj ⇒ ∃k : j ≤ k < length(σ) :T is true in sk).
A specification, say spec, is a tuple 〈Sfp , Lvp〉, where Sfp
is a safety specification and Lvp is a liveness specification.
A sequence σ satisfies spec iff it satisfies Sfp and Lvp .
Hence, for brevity, we say that the program specification
is an intersection of a safety specification and a liveness
specification.
Given a program p, a state predicate S, and specification
spec, we say S is an invariant of p iff (1) S is closed in p;
(2) Every computation of p that starts in a state, say s, where
s ∈ S satisfies spec; and (3) S 6= ∅.
D. Graceful Degradation
In graceful degradation, it is expected that the program will
satisfy a stronger specification under normal circumstances.
And, it will satisfy a weaker specification under some other
circumstances (e.g., in the presence of faults). Let spec =
〈Sf, Lv〉 and specr = 〈Sfr, Lvr〉 be two specifications. We
say that specr is weaker than spec iff for any sequence σ if
σ satisfies spec then σ satisfies specr.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT FOR GRACEFUL DEGRADATION
DESIGN
In this section, we formally define the problem of generating
a program that satisfies the weaker specification (cf. Figure 2).
We begin with a program p that satisfies the specification spec
from invariant I . We derive a graceful degrading program,
say pg , and its invariant Ig such that pg satisfies a weaker
specification, say specr from Ig . Next, we consider the relation
between p and pg as well as I and Ig to identify the problem
statement. One requirement on pg is that pg is supposed to add
new behaviors that potentially violate spec while satisfying
specr. And, it is not allowed to remove any behaviors of p
that satisfy spec. Since the correctness of p is known from
its invariant I , based on this requirement, it follows that I
should be a subset of Ig . Additionally, pg cannot remove
any behaviors (respectively, transitions) within the original
invariant I . Thus, the problem statement is shown as follows:
Problem Statement III.1:
Given p, I, spec and specr such that p satisfies
spec from I. Identify pg and Ig such that:
A1: pg|I = p|I, I ⊆ Ig.
A2: pg satisfies specr from Ig.
A3: pg|I satisfies spec from I.
Remark. The above problem statement has a requirement
that I be a subset of Ig . This requirement differs from [5]
in that this enlarges the invariant by adding new states from
where the new specification can be satisfied. By contrast, in
[5], the problem statement requires that the generated invariant
be a subset of the original invariant. For this reason, existing
algorithms cannot be used to solve the above problem.
IV. ALGORITHM FOR GENERATING GRACEFUL PROGRAM
We begin with the given program p, its invariant I and its
two specifications (stronger) spec and (weaker) specr. In turn,
spec and specr are specified in terms of the corresponding
safety and liveness specification. Our goal is to construct pg
and Ig such that they satisfy constraints of Problem III.1.
Algorithm 1 also takes an additional input which is a state
predicate, namely Sa. The intuition for Sa arises from the fact
that the program is expected to satisfy the specification specr
under certain constraints. Predicate Sa is used to characterize
these constraints. If such constraints are not easily identifiable,
Sa can be instantiated to be Sp−I , i.e., all states except those
in I .
First, Algorithm 1 computes I∆ to be the set of states in Sa
except those that violate safety (i.e., those in specrbs ). The first
guess for Ig , the invariant for the graceful program, is then set
to I∪I∆ (Line 2). Then, Algorithm 1 computes the first guess
for pg . Specifically, in pg , we reuse all the transitions in p that
begin in I . We also include all transitions that begin in I∆
unless they violate safety specrbt (Line 3). Starting from Line
4, the algorithm revises the program by ensuring the liveness
specification is satisfied. In Lines 6-9, we exclude the deadlock
states, i.e., states from where no transitions originates from Ig .
Then we recompute pg such that all the reachable states by
pg starting from I ′(or I) remains in I ′(or I respectively). To
ensure liveness, we define a function rank that assigns each
state an integer value that represents the length of the shortest
path from that state to reach a target state predicate T . Then,
on Lines 11 and 12, we exclude states and transitions where
rank does not decrease. Removal of such transitions ensures
that there will be no cycles that prevent the program from
reaching T . To resolve deadlock states, we repeat the loop
5starting at Line 4. Finally, this process stops once a fixpoint
is reached.
Algorithm 1 Graceful Program Generation
Input: state predicate Sa, program transitions p, invariant I , weaker
safety specification Sfr (consisting of Sfrbs and Sfrbt ), live-
ness specification Lv(consisting n leads-to properties of the form
Fi  Ti, i ∈ 1 · · ·n).
Output: graceful program pg and invariant Ig with weaker specifi-
cation.
1: I∆ := Sa − Sfrbs
2: I ′ := I ∪ I∆
3: p′ := {(s0, s1)|s0, s1 ∈ I ′ :: (s0 ∈ I ∧ (s0, s1) ∈ p) ∨ (s0 ∈
I∆ ∧ (s0, s1) /∈ SPECrbt)}
4: repeat
5: Iold := I
′, pold := p′
6: repeat
7: Iold := I
′
8: p′ := maxp(p′, I, I ′)
9: I ′ := I ′ − deadlock(I ′, p′)
10: until Iold = I ′
11: p′ := p′ − ⋃i∈1···n{(s0, s1)|s0 ∈ I ′ ∧ rank(s0, Ti, p′) >
rank(s1, Ti, p′) ∧ rank(s0, Ti, p′) 6= 0
∧rank(s1, Ti, p′) 6=∞}
12: I ′ := I ′−⋃i∈1···n{s|rank(s, Ti, p′) =∞∧s ∈ Fi∧s /∈ I}
13: until Iold = I ′ ∧ pold = p′
14: return p′ as pg , I ′ as Ig if I ′ 6= ∅, otherwise declare no graceful
program generated.
Function: maxp(t: transition predicate, S1,S2,· · · :set of state pred-
icates where S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ · · · )
return {(s0, s1)|t ∩ (s0 ∈ S1 ⇒ s1 ∈ S1) ∧ (s0 ∈ S2 ⇒ s1 ∈
S2) ∧ · · · }
Function: deadlock(S: state predicate , t: transition predicate)
return {s0|s0 ∈ S ∧ (∀s1 ∈ S : (s0, s1) /∈ t)}
Function: rank(s: state , T : state predicate , t: transition predicate)
return the shortest path length from s to one of the state in T , if
the path(consisting only transitions in t) exists; or ∞, otherwise.
We now prove the correctness of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 1 (Correctness of Algorithm 1). Let the input to
Algorithm 1 be:
− program p
− invariant I
− spec (original specification)
− specr (relaxed specification)
− Sa (state predicate)
Let the output of Algorithm 1 be:
− graceful program pg
− weaker invariant Ig
Then
1) I ⊆ I ′
2) p′ | I = p | I
3) p′ | I satisfies spec from I
4) p′ satisfies specr from I ′
Proof:
We proceed by proving each case.
1) I ⊆ I ′: From Line 2, there are two cases to consider:
(a) I ′ = I and (b) I ⊂ I ′.
a) I ′ = I: On Line 9, I ′ remains the same since
there is no deadlock state in the invariant of the
program. On Line 12, I ′ does not change. Hence,
I ′ = I through out.
b) I ⊂ I ′: On Line 9, I ⊆ I ′ since deadlock states ⊆
(I ′ − I). On Line 12, only states s ∈ I ′ − I are
removed. Hence, I ⊆ I ′.
From 1a and 1b, I ⊆ I ′.
2) p′ | I = p | I: From Line 3, (s0 ∈ I ∧ (s0, s1) ∈ p)
implies that p′ | I = p | I . On Line 8, computation of
maxp does not result in any state or transition in the
invariant being removed. Hence, the predicate p′ | I =
p | I holds. On Line 11, the set of transitions that are
removed are not in I . Hence, the condition holds through
out.
3) p′ | I satisfies spec from I: Since p satisfies spec from I
and none of the transitions that begin in I are removed,
then p′|I = p|I . Hence, p′ satisfies spec from I .
4) p′ satisfies specr from I’ : Closure of I ′ follows from
Line 8, where transitions that can potentially violate the
closure are removed in maxp. Also, by construction,
p′ cannot reach a state in specrbs and cannot execute
a transition in specrbt (Lines 3, 8 and 11). Finally, by
Lines 11 and 12, the liveness property is also satisfied.
Hence, p′ satisfies specr from I ′.
It can be noted that Algorithm 1 has a state predicate Sa
as input. The above lemma is valid for any input value of
Sa as it is only used to constrain the search space, if the
designer is already aware of constraints that would be met
even during graceful behavior. If the designer is not aware of
such constraints, Sa cannot be constrained and the whole state
space needs to be searched, i.e., Sa can be set to be equal to
Sp − I . Next, we prove that Algorithm 1 terminates.
Lemma 2 (Termination of Algorithm 1). Let the input to
Algorithm 1 be:
− program p
− invariant I
− spec (original specification)
− specr (relaxed specification)
− Sa (state predicate)
Then, Algorithm 1 terminates in polynomial time in the state
space of p.
Proof:
We need to show that the two loops (Lines 6-10 and 4-13)
terminate. We prove this by showing the existence of a least
fixpoint for both loops.
− Inner loop (Lines 6-10): The loop terminates when
Iold = I
′. As I ′ becomes smaller with each iteration
(Lines 8 and 9) and since I ′ ⊆ Iold, the loop will
definitely terminate when I ′ = ∅.
− Outer loop (Lines 4-13): The loop terminates when
(Iold = I
′) ∧ (pold = p′). As I ′ and p′ become
smaller with each iteration (Lines 11 and 12) and since
(I ′ ⊆ Iold) ∧ (p′ ⊆ pold), the loop will terminate.
6Theorem 1. Let the input to Algorithm 1 be: (i) program
p, (ii) invariant I , (iii) original specification spec, (iv) specr
(relaxed specification) and (v) Sa (state predicate)
Then, Algorithm 1 solves problem III.1 in polynomial time.
Proof: It follows directly from Lemmas 1 and 2.
V. GRACEFUL DEGRADATION DESIGN: CASE STUDIES
In this section, we demonstrate the process of generating
the gracefully degrading programs through two case studies,
namely (i) a printer system and (ii) a resource constraint
problem motivated by cellular networks. In each case study,
we first define the program with its specification (including the
original and the graceful specification). Then, we simulate the
algorithm on each case study. Subsequently in Section VIII,
we revisit them in the context of adding fault-tolerance.
A. Printer System
In the first case study, we focus on the printer system con-
sidered in [4]. In the original specification, the printer system
is required to satisfy the FIFO specification. However, as
argued in [4], it may be necessary to relax this requirement
under certain constraints. In particular, the weaker requirement
considered in [4] requires that some out-of-order printing is
permitted.
Original program. The program in [4] consists of several
clients and print servers. Using the transaction semantics, the
clients ‘enqueue’ their print requests in a central queue. A
print server then removes a task from this non-empty queue
and prints the task. Please observe that the queue is of bounded
length as we assume finite state programs. For simplicity, we
do not model the transactions used for concurrency control
and the enqueue operation since it does not affect the behavior
we are interested in. The original program, say printolerant,
consists of two parts (1) once ith task has been dequeued
(di = 1) and it has not been printed (pi = 0), then print it
(pi := 1) and (2) if the ith task has been printed (pi = 1), then
the next Task (i + 1) in queue gets a chance to be dequeued
(di+1 := 1). Thus actions are as follows:
di = 1 ∧ pi = 0 −→ pi := 1
pi = 1 −→ di+1 := 1
For sake of simplicity, in this paper, we consider the case
where the number of jobs is enumerated explicitly. To make
this more generic, one can utilize approaches for parametric
synthesis where the number of jobs is left as a parameter.
Examples of such parametric approaches are discussed in [9],
[10].
Safety Specification. Recall that the safety specification
is in terms of a set of bad states that the program should not
reach and a set of bad transitions that the program should
not execute. The first specification Sfbs 1 is satisfied by the
original program and requires that the printing must occur in
order and, hence, Task j cannot be dequeued until Task j− 1
is printed. The graceful specification permits the possibility
that Task j can be dequeued even if Task j− 1 is not printed.
However, it requires that Task j cannot be dequeued until Task
j − 2 is printed. Thus, the safety specification (original and
graceful) that identifies the states that should not be reached
is specified as follows:
Sfbs 1 := ∃i, j ∈ 1 · · ·n, pi(s) = 0 ∧ dj(s) = 1 ∧ j > i
Sfbs 2 := ∃i, j ∈ 1 · · ·n, pi(s) = 0∧ dj(s) = 1∧ j > i+1
Observe that Sfbs 1 is the stronger specification capturing
the notion of FIFO, and Sfbs 2 is a weaker specification since
it allows at most two tasks be dequeued without finishing
the pending printing. One could consider further relaxation
that allows more out-of-order printing. Our algorithm can be
applied in this context by applying Algorithm 1 to the program
described at the end of this section. However, the detailed
analysis of this generation is outside the scope of this paper.
In addition to bad states, safety specification can include bad
transitions that the program is not allowed to execute. The bad
transitions, Sfbt c, describe structural constraints that have to
be satisfied by the printer system. In particular, Sfbt c states
that a printed task cannot be reset to unprinted. Likewise, once
the task has been dequeued it cannot be re-enqueued. And,
a task cannot be printed until it is dequeued. Note that the
structural constraints have to be satisfied in the original as
well as the graceful program. Also, at most one variable can
be changed in any transition. Thus,
Sfbt c := {(s, s′)|∃i, j ∈ 1 · · ·n,
(pi(s) = 1 ∧ pi(s′) = 0)
∨ (di(s) = 1 ∧ di(s′) = 0)
∨ (di(s′) = 0 ∧ pi(s′) = 1)
∨ (i 6= j ∧ di(s) 6= di(s′) ∧ dj(s) 6= dj(s′))
∨ (i 6= j ∧ pi(s) 6= pi(s′) ∧ pj(s) 6= pj(s′))
∨ (di(s) 6= di(s′) ∧ pj(s) 6= pj(s′))}
We use safety specification for original program as Sfbs 1
and Sfbt c; for graceful program as Sfbs 2 and Sfbt c. Note
that although the set of bad transitions are the same here, it is
not a requirement for Algorithm 1.
Liveness Specification. The liveness specification requires
that eventually all tasks are printed. Thus,
Lv := true SL, where SL := ∀i ∈ 1 · · ·n, di = pi(s) =
1 .
Application of Algorithm 1. We instantiate Algorithm 1
with following inputs:
− program p: is instantiated to be transitions corresponding
to program printolerant. For simplicity, we assume that
there are three tasks in the system. Hence, the state of
the program is represented as (d1d2d3, p1p2p3), where
di (respectively, pi) denotes whether Task i has been
dequeued (respectively printed).
− The safety specification is instantiated so that the set
of bad states is Sfbs 2 and the set of bad transitions is
Sfbt c .
− Liveness specification is specified to be Lv.
− Invariant I is instantiated to be the states reached in the
computation of printolerant by starting from the initial
state (000, 000).
− State predicate Sa is instantiated to be Sp − I
7Consider the candidate states generated outside I from Line
1 that also exclude those violate Sfbs 2 . Recall that Sfbs 2
allows two tasks to be dequeued at once and allows one task
to be printed before the previous task is completed. Thus, we
have
I∆ = {(110, 000), (110, 010), (111, 010), (111, 011),
(110, 110), (111, 100), (111, 101), (010, 000), (010, 010),
(011, 010), (011, 011)}
The new program transitions generated are all possible pairs
of states in I∆ plus those that provide recovery from I∆ to I
provided that they do not violate Sfbt c. There are no deadlock
states on Line 8. Moreover, since every state in I or I∆ has
a path to a state where all tasks are completed, no state and
transition are removed on Lines 11 and 12.
Now, we evaluate the new behavior of the printer system in
pg provided in Figure 4. Ideally, the program stays in invariant
I while satisfying Sfbs 1, Sfbt c and Lv. However, if the
program is perturbed to be outside I then it will satisfy Sfbs 2,
Sfbt c and Lv. Figure 4 shows the behavior of the graceful
program. Note that in this program, the tasks being printed are
not totally out of order, though it is not FIFO. For example,
Task 3 can be printed before Task 2 but Task 3 cannot be
printed before Task 1.
000,000 100,000 100,100 110,100 110,110 111,110 111,111
111,100 111,101
110,000 110,010 111,010 111,011
101,100 101,101
010,000 010,010 011,010 011,011
Fig. 4: Printer System with original invariant I =
{(000,000),(100,000),(100,100),(110,100),(110,110),(111,110),(111,111)}
and invariant (under weaker specification) Ig =
I ∪ {(110,000),(110,010),(111,010),(111,011),(110,110),(111,100),(111,101),
(010,000),(010,010),(011,010),(011,011)}
B. Resource Constraint Problem: Channel Assignment
In this section, we model the problem of resource con-
straints in a wireless cellular network [11]. When a call is
made, a number of channels are assigned to it. However, due
to the finite number of channels available, these have to be
shared among a finite number of calls, and call degradation can
be incorporated to maximize the revenue by maximizing the
number of admitted calls. For brevity, we consider a simplified
version of this problem and describe how Algorithm 1 can be
applied to generate a graceful program.
In such a network, each cell is associated with a set of
frequencies. Each frequency can be used by a single call.
However, to improve quality of the call, one call may be
assigned several frequencies. Clearly, if a call is assigned 0
channels/frequencies then the call cannot be completed and the
call fails. As the number of assigned channels increases the
call quality improves. There is a minimum number of channels
(MIN ) that must be allocated to a call so that the call quality
is at an acceptable level. Also, there is a maximum number
of channels (MAX) that should be allocated, as allocating
subsequent channels does not lead to improvement in call
quality.
From a user perspective, to keep user satisfaction at higher
levels, it is desirable to assign as many channels as possible
to every call, up to MAX channels. And, from a system
perspective, it is desirable to assign as few channels as
possible so that the probability of a call failure (where the
call is dropped due to unavailable channels) is kept very low.
To simplify the modeling of this system, we consider the
case where the maximum channels allocated to a call is 3
(MAX = 3) and the minimum number of channels allocated
is 2 (MIN = 2).
Normally, each call in such a system is defined by the
following parameters:
− Channel requirements: Each call defines its preferred (or
maximum) number of channels.
− Priority: This determines the class/type of the call.
− Degradation tolerance: The (maximum) number of chan-
nels that can be reclaimed from the call.
− Admission policy: If a cell becomes saturated, it can
either reject an incoming call or degrade ongoing calls
to accommodate new calls.
− Revenue: Each admitted call generates a revenue based
on the agreed QoS (i.e., number of channels).
For the purpose of keeping the case study simple, we
consider all calls to be of the same priority and all calls have a
degradation tolerance of 1 (MAX−MIN ). For the admission
policy, we consider call degradation (for gracefully degrading
calls). We do not model revenue as such, but try to maximize
the number of admitted calls. Furthermore, we also assume
that there is a finite number of channels and calls and that
calls are of infinite duration, i.e., reclamation of channels is
omitted for simplicity. We note that these assumptions are only
for simplicity and Algorithm 1 can be easily applied in cases
where these assumptions are omitted.
Original program The system begins with a given number
(MAXC) of available channels. A call is admitted to the sys-
tem only if it can be allocated MAX (3) channels. Otherwise,
the call fails. To model such a program, for each call, we
maintain a variable ci that denotes whether call i is current
(i.e., admitted) and variable ai that denotes the number of
channels allocated to call i. Instead, we assume that actions
for allocating channels to call i are executed only when call
i is requesting them. We also use variable av to denote the
number of available channels. This variable is initialized to
MAXC in the initial state.
ci = 0 ∧ av ≥ 3 −→ ci, ai, av = 1, 3, av − 3
Original safety property
The original safety specification requires that each admitted
call is either allocated three channels or no channel. It also
requires that the total number of allocated and unallocated
channels equal to MAXC. Thus, the safety specification of
the original program is:
8Sfbs 1 := (∃i : ci = 0 ∧ ai 6= 0)
∨ (∃i : ci = 1 ∧ ai 6= 3)
∨ (∑ni=1 ai + av 6=MAXC)
where n is the number of admitted calls.
Also, since we are not modeling release of channels, we
say that the following transitions – where we start in a state
where a call has been assigned some channels and end up in
a state where the call has been assigned less channels – also
violate safety.
Sfbt c := (∃i :: ci = 1 ∧ c′i = 0) ∨ (av′ > av)
Original liveness Specification.
The liveness specification requires that all calls are serviced
when channels are available. Thus, the liveness specification
is as follows
Lv := true ((∀i :: ci = 1) ∨ av < 3)
Relaxed safety property.
Observe that the original program requires that each active
call is assigned three channels. Based on the earlier discussion,
the relaxed program is permitted to assign two channels to
a call or 1 channel can be reclaimed from ongoing calls.
However, since the goal of the channel assignment program
is to assign two channels only if required, we capture this
with the following relaxed safety property. Intuitively, this
relaxed safety property requires that if some call is assigned
two channels, it is due to the fact that it could not be assigned
the three possible channels. Hence, the states that should not
be reached in the graceful program are
Sfbs 2 := (∃i :: ci = 1 ∧ ((ai 6= 3) ∨ (ai = 2 ∧ av > 0)))
∨(∑ni=1 ai + av 6=MAXC)
Application of Algorithm 1.
We instantiate Algorithm 1 with the following inputs:
− The set of program transitions is instantiated with those
associated with the original program, denoted by Pc in
subsequent description. For illustration, we assume that
the total available channels is MAXC = 7. We repre-
sent the state of Pc as (av, c1c2c3 · · · cn, a1a2a3 · · · an),
where ci denotes whether call i is admitted, ai denotes
the number of channels allocated to call i and av de-
notes the number of remaining channels. For illustration
purpose, we consider the case where the number of calls
is 3, i.e., n = 3.
− The invariant I is instantiated to be states reached from
the initial state where all (7) channels are available and
no channel is allocated to any call. Thus, I is the set of
states reached from the state (7, 000, 000) in the original
program.
− The state predicate Sa, is instantiated to be SPc − I (set
of states of Pc except the states in the invariant).
− We instantiate the safety specification with Sfbs 2, the
set of bad states for the graceful program, and Sfbt c,
the set of bad transitions.
− The liveness specification is instantiated with Lv.
Since the relaxed safety specification requires that a call is
assigned two channels only if no free channels are available,
the only states in Sa from where two channels are allocated
to a process are those where the number of free channels is
either 0, 1 or 2. Moreover, since the sum of the assigned
and free channels is equal to MAXC, any action added to
the relaxed program can only redistribute channels among
processes. Hence, the relaxed program includes the following
three actions that correspond to the case where the number of
available channels is either 0, 1 or 2. It also includes actions
where we only switch between channels assigned to a single
call. Thus, the actions are as follows:
ci = 0 ∧ ai = 0 ∧ av = 0 ∧ cj = ck = 1 ∧ aj = ak = 3
−→ ci, ai, aj , ak := 1, 2, 2, 2
ci = 0 ∧ ai = 0 ∧ av = 1 ∧ cj = 1 ∧ aj = 3
−→ ci, ai, aj , av := 1, 2, 2, 0
ai = 0 ∧ av = 2
−→ ci, ai := 1, 2
ci = cj = 1 ∧ ai = 2 ∧ aj = 3
−→ ai, aj := 3, 2
where i j and k are quantified over the number
of calls in the system.
We can also visualize the above actions as shown in
Figure 5.
7,000,000 4,100,300 1,110,330
6,000,000 3,100,300 0,110,330
5,000,000 2,100,300 0,110,320 0,110,230
4,000,000 1,100,300 0,110,220
3,000,000 0,100,300
Fig. 5: Cellular Networks: MAXC = 7, MAX = 3, MIN = 2,
Degradation tolerance = 1.
VI. ALGORITHM FOR GENERATING DISTRIBUTED
GRACEFUL PROGRAMS
In this section, we extend Algorithm 1 (see Section IV) to
handle distributed programs. In particular, Algorithm 1 focuses
on deriving a concurrent graceful program, where the program
is able to read and update all variables in an atomic step. In
applying Algorithm 1 to distributed programs, it is necessary
that the generated program can be implemented using a set of
processes.
The main difference between a concurrent program and a
distributed program is that, in a distributed program, each
process may have some private variables to which they have
sole access. Use of such variables is essential in ensuring
that the graceful program is implementable in a distributed
system. As an illustration, if we model processes that may
be byzantine, then the knowledge of whether a process is
byzantine must necessarily be private to that process.
There are several ways to model such distributed programs.
One approach is to utilize message passing, where all process
9information is private. And, channels are introduced between
processes so that they can send information to other processes.
We can observe that in such a system, a channel is a shared
object that is accessed by the processes on both ends of it. To
manage complexity, however, it is desirable to utilize models
that hide such detailed implementation. One such approach is
to use shared memory model. In shared memory model, each
process can read the (public) variables of its neighbors (in a
pre-defined neighbor list) and update its own information.
Modeling Distributed Programs. To capture shared memory
programs, we use the approach in [12]. Specifically, we
introduce wi as a set of variables that process i can write
and ri as a set of variables process that i can read. We model
these restrictions as follows:
Write Restriction. Given a transition (s0, s1), we can triv-
ially identify variables written in this transition. In particular,
if value of a variable in s0 differs from that in s1 then that
variable has been written by the transition. Hence, we can
model write restriction by preventing process i from utilizing
transitions that write variables are outside wi. Thus, a write
restriction prevents a process from utilizing transitions:
write(i, wi) = {(s0, s1)|∃x ∈ wi :: x(s0) 6= x(s1)}
To model write restrictions, we can simply add the above
transitions to the transitions that violate safety as far as process
i is concerned. If a transition cannot be executed by any
process then we can simply add it to transitions that violate
safety (while specifying input for Algorithm 1).
Read Restriction. A state s0 is uniquely decided by knowing
the values of all program variables. Hence, any transition
(s0, s1) essentially reads all variables. Hence, modeling read
restrictions requires a slightly different approach. If a process
executes a transition (s0, s1) but it cannot read some variable,
say v, then it must execute a corresponding transition in s′0
where s0 and s′0 are identical except for the value of v. In
other words, read restriction causes program transitions to be
grouped.
Now, consider the case where two transitions (s0, s1) and
(s′0, s
′
1) are grouped due to read restrictions. We now identify
how s′0 and s
′
1 are related to s0 and s1. For simplicity
of discussion, we consider the case where wi ⊆ ri, i.e.,
processes that can write a variable can also read it. Under
these circumstances, if (s0, s1) and (s′0, s
′
1) are grouped due
to read restrictions then values of all variables in ri are equal
in s0 and s′0. In other words, due to read restrictions, s0 and s
′
0
are indistinguishable for process i. Likewise, s1 and s′1 must
also be indistinguishable for process i.
For variables not in ri, based on our assumption that
wi ⊆ ri, neither transition (s0, s1) nor (s′0, s′1) can change
that variable. Hence, the group of transitions associated with
(s0, s1) is given by the following formula.
group(i, ri)(s0, s1) =
{(s′0, s′1)|(∀x ∈ ri :: x(s0) = x(s′0) ∧ x(s1) = x(s′1))∧
(∀x /∈ ri :: x(s′0) = x(s′1) ∧ x(s0) = x(s1))}
We handle the distribution issues during Algorithm 1 as
follows. Write restrictions are added to safety violating tran-
sitions and, hence, would be removed. Read restrictions are
ignored initially, i.e., in the loop 4-13. However, just before
we check the condition on Line 13 that determines whether the
loop should terminate, we attempt to remove the corresponding
group of transitions removed in the loop. However, if removal
of some transition, say t1, causes removal of transition t2 and
t2 is a transition in I × I then we only remove t1 but not the
corresponding group. This is due to the fact that Problem III.1
prevents us from removing transitions in I × I . It is therefore
possible that the transitions of the graceful program may not
satisfy the read restrictions entirely. Based on this discussion,
we present the following algorithm snippet (Algorithm 2) that
is inserted between Line 12 and Line 13 in Algorithm 1 to
handle read restrictions.
Algorithm 2 Handle read restriction, insert between Line 12
and Line 13 in Algorithm 1
for each process j do
pr := pold − p′
prj := transitions of process j in pr
for each t ∈ prj do
p′ := p′ − (group(j, rj)(t)− I × I)
end for
end for
Theorem 2. Let 1-R denote the algorithm obtained by adding
Algorithm 2 to Algorithm 1 between lines 12 and 13. Then,
Algorithm 1-R solves problem III.1 in polynomial time in the
presence of read-write restrictions.
Proof: All the transitions that have been removed in one
pass through the iteration are collected and the respective read
restriction group, for each process, is removed. This group
does not contain any transition τ ∈ I× I . Thus, problem III.1
(A1) is satisfied. Since all deadlock states in I ′ are removed,
and maxp returns the largest program, problem III.1 (A2) is
satisfied. Finally, problem III.1 (A3) is satisfied as no transition
in I is removed and that p satisfies spec from I .
VII. CASE STUDY FOR GRACEFUL DISTRIBUTED
PROGRAMS
In this section, we present the case study for byzantine
agreement problem. In the canonical version of byzantine
agreement, there is a general process and three non-general
processes. In an ideal scenario, the general sends a decision
(either 0 or 1) to non-generals. The non-generals receive
this decision and finalize their decision to be that of the
general. This ensures strong validity, i.e., the decision of the
non-generals is the same as that of the general and strong
agreement, i.e., the decision of the non-generals match with
each other.
One can consider some graceful versions of this. One
graceful version allows a non-general to be byzantine and,
hence, allows it to change its decision. For this graceful
version, the program satisfies weak validity, i.e., the decision
of the non-byzantine non-general is the same as that of the
general provided the non-general is non-byzantine and weak
agreement, the decision of the non-general is the same as
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that of another non-general provided both are not byzantine.
2 The program for the ideal scenario suffices to deal with
ensuring weak validity and weak agreement if a non-general
is byzantine.
In this case study, we begin with this program as our input
program for which we want to add graceful degradation. 3
Subsequently, we derive a graceful version of this program
that only satisfies weak agreement. Finally, we utilize
this derived graceful program along with the original pro-
gram to derive a fault-tolerant graceful degradation byzantine
agreement program, i.e., a program that (1) satisfies weak
validity and weak agreement in the absence of faults
and (2) satisfies weak agreement in the presence of faults,
where the fault makes the general process byzantine.
Original Program.
1) State Space: The program consists of one general pro-
cess (g) and three non-general processes, i, j and k. Each
process maintains a decision variable d. For process g, the
value for decision d can either be 0 or 1. For processes i, j
and k, the decision value can be ⊥, 0 or 1. The value ⊥
denotes that the corresponding non-general process has not
received the decision from general. Each non-general also
maintains a variable f that is 0 initially and is set to 1 when it
finalizes its decision. Also, the variable b maintained in each
process denotes whether the process is byzantine (b = 1) or
not (b = 0). Thus, the variables are defined as follows.
− d.g : {0, 1}, d.i, d.j, d.k : {0, 1,⊥}, b.g, b.i, b.j, b.k :
{true, false}
− f.i, f.j, f.k : {0, 1}
2) Specification of Byzantine Agreement: As described
above, the original safety specification is weak validity
and weak agreement. Weak validity requires non-
byzantine non-generals to finalize their decision to be the same
as that of the general. Weak agreement requires that the final
decision of any two non-byzantine non-generals should be
the same. Additionally, the notion of finalization requires that
a non-general cannot finalize the decision ⊥ and it cannot
change it after it finalizes it. Thus, the set of bad states or
transitions identified by these specifications are as follows:
specbs va =∃l ∈ i, j, k ::
¬b.l ∧ d.l 6= d.g ∧ f.l = 1
specbs ag =∃p, q ∈ i, j, k ::
¬b.p ∧ ¬b.q
∧ d.p 6= d.q
∧ f.p = 1 ∧ f.q = 1
specbs nb =∃l ∈ i, j, k ::
¬b.l ∧ f.l = 1 ∧ d.l = ⊥
specbt fi = {(s, s′)|∃l ∈ i, j, k ::
s(f.l) = 1 ∧ s(b.l) = 0∧
(s(d.l) 6= s′(d.l) ∨ s′(f.l) = 0)}
2The Agreement requirement generally considered in the literature corre-
sponds to weak agreement from this paper. The Validity requirement gen-
erally considered in the literature is slightly different from weak validity
considered here. Specifically, weak validity requires the non-general to
be non-byzantine. But does not impose the same requirement on the general.
This is due to the fact that weak validity is expected to be satisfied
in the absence of faults (that make the general byzantine) and only weak
agreement is expected to be satisfied in the presence of faults.
3We could also apply Algorithm 1 to the program where the original
specification is strong validity and strong agreement. However,
the corresponding derivation is outside the scope of this paper.
The original safety specification, spec, is specified in terms
of the set of bad states, (specbs va ∪ specbs ag ∪ specbs nb),
and the set of bad transitions specbt fi.
Finally, the liveness specification, Lv requires (for both
original and graceful program) that each non-byzantine non-
general finalizes its decision. This is specified as follows:
Lv := true (∀p ∈ i, j, k :: (b.p = 0)→ (f.p = 1))
3) Actions for Original Program: As discussed above, the
original program deals with the case where a non-general is
byzantine but not the case where a general is byzantine. The
actions of the original program are as follows:
d.j = ⊥ ∧ f.j = 0 −→ d.j := d.g
d.j 6= ⊥ ∧ f.j = 0 −→ f.j := 1
b.j −→ d.j := 0|1
The last action is the one that allows a byzantine non-
general to change its decision. Since Problem Statement III.1
guarantees to preserve existing behavior, these actions would
be preserved in the final program. These actions are treated as
environment actions, i.e., actions that eventually stop. Hence,
they are not considered in resolving liveness on Lines 11 and
12.
4) Invariant of Original Program: The invariant can be
computed from the initial state where the general is not
byzantine and at most one non-general may be byzantine.
Moreover, the decision of each non-general is ⊥ and it has
not finalized its decision. The states reached from this initial
state by the computation of the above program are as follows:
I = ¬b.g ∧ (¬b.i ∨ ¬b.j) ∧ (¬b.j ∨ ¬b.k) ∧ (¬b.i ∨ ¬b.k)
∧(∀p :: ¬b.p⇒ (d.p = ⊥ ∨ d.p = d.g))
∧(∀p :: (¬b.p ∧ f.p)⇒ (d.p 6= ⊥))
Graceful program. The graceful program is intended
for the scenarios where the general is byzantine. Hence, the
weaker specification specr is specified in terms of the set
of bad states, (specbs ag ∪ specbs nb), and the set of bad
transitions specbt fi.
We now illustrate Algorithm 1 in the context of byzantine
agreement. In particular, we instantiate Algorithm 1 with (1)
p, the transitions of the original program, (2) spec and specr
representing the original and weaker specification, (3) liveness
specification Lv, (4) invariant I , and (5) state predicate Sa
equal to b.g∧¬b.i∧¬b.j∧¬b.k. Note that the last parameter is
based on the observation that the graceful program is intended
for scenarios where the general is byzantine. Now, we evaluate
Algorithm 1 on these inputs.
Lines 1-2: Identifying invariant (I ′). The algorithm starts
with generating all possible states in invariant satisfying
weaker safety specification. Since we include original invariant
(I) in the fault-intolerant program, the invariant (I∆) not in I
is enumerated as follows.
1) First, observe that Sa requires that only the general is
byzantine and no non-general is byzantine.
2) Considering states in Sa further, we observe (a) I∆
includes all states where d.i = d.j = d.k is true. This is
due to the fact that in such states agreement is satisfied
irrespective of values of b.i, b.j, b.k, b.g., f.i, f.j, f.k or
d.g. (b) Now, consider states where some two non-
generals, say i and j differ. To ensure Agreement,
in such states in I∆, either d.i (or d.j) should be equal
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to ⊥ or f.i (or f.j) must be 0. (c) If I∆ includes a state
where f.j is 1 then d.j must be different from ⊥.
Hence, after computation by Line 1, we have
I∆ = (b.g = 1 ∧ b.i = b.j = b.k = 0)∧
(∀l ∈ i, j, k : f.l = 1→ d.l 6= ⊥)∧
∨ d.i = d.j = d.kd.i 6= d.j → (d.i = ⊥ ∨ d.j = ⊥ ∨ f.i = 0 ∨ f.j = 0)d.i 6= d.k → (d.i = ⊥ ∨ d.k = ⊥ ∨ f.i = 0 ∨ f.k = 0)
d.j 6= d.k → (d.j = ⊥ ∨ d.k = ⊥ ∨ f.j = 0 ∨ f.k = 0)

Line 3: Identifying a set of transitions (p′) not violating
safety specification. After enumerating the possible states in
I∆ generated on Line 1, the algorithm generates p′ by reusing
p as well as including any transition in space I∆×I ′ that does
not violate the specification specr.
If following Algorithm 1 as is, it would include transitions
where process j changes the value of d.k. Or, it may include
transitions of process j that rely on the general being non-
byzantine. Since this would be unacceptable in the fault-
tolerant graceful degradation program, as it would be impos-
sible to implement such a program, we utilize the approach
discussed in Section VI to model ability of different processes
to read and write variables.
Loop 4-13: Resolving deadlock states and liveness viola-
tion. It is straightforward to observe that in this case, the
following transitions can be included in p′: (1) A process
that has not finalized can change its decision to 0 or 1 non-
deterministically, or (2) A process can finalize as long as its
decision is not ⊥ and another process has not finalized with
a different decision.
Notation. We use the sequence 〈x1, x2, x3, x4〉 to denote
the set of states where the value of x1 equals d.g, the value
of x2 equals d.i, the value of x3 equals d.j and the value of
x4 equals d.k. We use ‘∗’ to denote that the decision value of
certain process is irrelevant. For example 〈∗, 1, 1, 1〉 denotes
the set of states where d.i = d.j = d.k = 1 and d.g is either
0 or 1.
In such a program, there are no deadlock states. How-
ever, some transitions need to be removed due to non-
decreasing rank value (Line 11). In particular, consider a state
in 〈∗, 0, 0, 1〉 where process k has not finalized its decision.
Further consider the transition where process i changes its
decision to 1. This transition is removed since the rank of
both states (number of steps to reach a state where all non-
byzantine non-generals have finalized) is the same. In other
words, a process in majority cannot change its decision to the
minority process unless that minority process has finalized its
decision.
At this point, we reach the end of the loop (Line 13). Since
we need to consider grouping caused by read restrictions, this
results in removal of all transitions where a process in majority
changes its decision to one that is in the minority, irrespective
of whether the minority process has finalized. (Note that this
removal does not impact transitions in I and the invariant of
the original program, since there is no corresponding state in
I .)
While we omit the detailed analysis of different iterations of
this loop, we note that the transitions of the graceful program
for process i in states outside I are as shown in Figure 6.
(Recall that the transitions for process i inside I are the same
as that of the original program.):
d.i = ⊥ −→ d.i := d.g
d.i = ⊥ ∧ (d.j = d.k = ⊥) −→ d.i := 0|1
d.i = ⊥ ∧ f.i = 0 ∧ ( (d.j 6= d.g ∧ d.j 6= ⊥)∨
(d.j 6= d.k ∧ d.k 6= ⊥)) −→ d.i := 0|1
d.i 6= ⊥ ∧ f.i = 0 ∧ (d.i = d.j ∨ d.i = d.k) −→ f.i := 1
d.i 6= ⊥ ∧ f.i = 0 ∧ (d.j = d.k = ⊥ ∧ d.i = d.g)−→ f.i := 1
d.i 6= ⊥ ∧ f.i = 0∧
d.j 6= ⊥ ∧ d.i 6= d.j ∧ d.j = d.k −→ d.i := d.j
Fig. 6: Byzantine Agreement: Actions for Graceful Program
VIII. ADDING FAULT-TOLERANCE TO PROGRAM WITH
GRACEFUL DEGRADATION
In this section, we present the second step in the two-
step approach, namely, adding fault-tolerance to the graceful
program. Hence, we first introduce the notion of faults. Then,
in Problem Statement VIII.2, we formalize the requirements
for adding fault-tolerant graceful-degradation. Subsequently,
we continue with the two case studies discussed in Section
V by utilizing the original and graceful program to obtain
a fault-tolerant graceful-degradation program. For brevity, we
only focus on one of the levels of tolerance, namely masking
tolerance.
The faults, say f , that a program is subject to is repre-
sented by a set of transitions. Specifically, given a program p
= 〈Sp, δp〉, faults f are a subset of Sp × Sp. We use p[]f to
denote the transitions obtained by taking the union of p and
f .
Masking fault-tolerance. One can consider different
levels of tolerance, namely failsafe, nonmasking and masking,
to a given fault based on whether the program satisfies safety
and/or liveness in the presence of faults. Masking fault-tolerant
program ensures that in the absence of faults, it satisfies its
specification (including both safety and liveness). Moreover,
in the absence of faults, it remains inside its invariant. In the
presence of faults, it may be perturbed to a state outside its
invariant. Let T be the boundary up to which the program can
be perturbed due to faults and subsequent program actions. A
masking fault-tolerant program ensures that starting from any
state in T , it recovers to its invariant. Thus, it ensures that
after faults occur, the program recovers to states from where
both safety and liveness are satisfied. Additionally, during this
recovery, it satisfies the safety specification.
Based on this intuition, we formally define a program, say
p, is masking f -tolerant to spec (=〈Sf, Lv〉) from I iff the
following conditions hold:
(1) p satisfies spec from I .
(2) ∃T :: (a) I ⊆ T . (b) p[]f satisfies Sf from T . (c) Every
computation of p[]f that starts from a state in T has a state in I .
Now we consider the problem of adding fault-tolerance to
the graceful program. Intuitively, the resulting fault-tolerant
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program, say pf , is required to satisfy the original (stronger)
specification in the absence of faults. However, when the
program is perturbed by faults, the program is guaranteed to
recover to states from where it satisfies the weaker specifica-
tion. We formally identify the problem in Problem Statement
VIII.2, as follows.
Problem Statement VIII.2:
Addition of Fault-Tolerant Graceful-Degradation
Given p, spec, I , such that p satisfies spec from I;
pg , specr , Ig , such that pg satisfies specr from Ig;
I ⊆ Ig , p |I ⊆ pg |I , f .
Does there exist If , Igf and pf such that
B1:If ⊆I , pf |If ⊆pg |Igf
B2:Igf ⊆Ig , pf |Igf ⊆pg |Igf .
B3:pf satisfies spec from If .
B4:pf is masking f -tolerant for specr from Igf .
As one can imagine, it should be possible to reuse existing
algorithms for adding fault-tolerance to add fault-tolerant
graceful degradation. However, one needs to ensure that during
such reuse, the synthesized program satisfies the weaker
specification in the presence of faults. By contrast, (assuming
that satisfying the stronger specification were not feasible),
the existing algorithm for adding fault-tolerance will declare
failure to add fault-tolerance. There are several algorithms [1],
[5], [13] for adding fault-tolerance in the literature. In this
section, we plan to utilize them as a black box, i.e., we only
rely on the assumption that they satisfy the problem of adding
fault-tolerance (repeated from [5]).
Problem Statement VIII.3:
Addition of Fault-Tolerance
Given p, spec, I , f such that p satisfies spec from I;
Does there exist If , and pf such that
C1:If ⊆I , pf |If ⊆p |If
C2:pf is masking f -tolerant for spec from If .
In order to describe the fault-tolerant program subject to the
constraints in Problem Statement VIII.2, we can utilize any of
the algorithms [1], [5], [13]. We use the name Add masking
to describe such a generic algorithm. Since our reuse is black-
box in nature, we only rely on the proof (from [1], [5], [13])
that it satisfies Problem VIII.3. However, for the convenience
of the reader, we briefly describe the key steps of these
algorithms. Given the fault-intolerant program, a set of fault
transitions, the invariant and specification, Add masking
first ensures all the reachable states by p[]f satisfy safety
specification and then excludes the computation that starts
outside the invariant and cannot possibly reach a state in the
invariant. In addition, Add masking also resolves deadlock
states and removes computations that reach the deadlock states
if it is impossible to add recovery.
The algorithm for adding fault-tolerant graceful degradation
is as shown in Algorithm 3. First, it invokes Add masking
(Line 4) that satisfies the constraints of Problem VIII.3. The
input to Add masking consists of the graceful program pg ,
fault transition f , invariant of the graceful program Ig , and
weaker specification specr. Add masking returns p′ and I ′
such that constraints of Problem VIII.3 are satisfied. Note that
p′ satisfies the weaker specification in the absence of faults.
Hence, we consider the computations of p′ on I ∩ I ′ (Line 5)
by computing I ∩ I ′ and p′′|(I ∩ I ′), i.e., a program whose
transitions are a subset of the transitions of p and p′. Since
the transitions of this program are a subset of that of p, it
satisfies the stronger specification, spec, as long as it does not
deadlock in any state in I ∩ I ′. If there are deadlock states,
those are removed (Loop 6-11) and the process is repeated
(Loop 2-12).
Algorithm 3 Adding Fault-tolerance to Graceful Program
Input: fault-intolerant program p, graceful program transitions pg ,
fault transitions f , invariant I , graceful invariant Ig , weaker
specification specr .
Output: masking fault-tolerant program pf
1: p′ := pg , I ′ := Ig , I ′′ := I
2: repeat
3: Iold := I
′, pold := p′
4: p′, I ′ := Add masking(p′, f, I ′, specr)
5: I ′′ := I ′′ ∩ I ′, p′ := p′ − (I ′′ × ¬I ′′), p′′ := p′|I ′′
6: while deadlock(I ′′, p′′) 6= ∅ do
7: I ′ := I ′ − deadlock(I ′′, p′′)
8: I ′′ := I ′′ ∩ I ′
9: p′ := maxp(p′, I ′′, I ′)
10: p′′ := p′|I ′′
11: end while
12: until Iold = I ′ ∧ pold = p′
13: return p′ as pf , I ′ as Igf , and I
′′ as If
We now prove the correctness of Algorithm 3.
Lemma 3 (Correctness of Algorithm 3). Let the input to
Algorithm 3 be:
− fault-intolerant program p,
− invariant I ,
− spec (original specification),
− graceful program pg ,
− specr (relaxed specification),
− Ig (graceful invariant), and
− fault f
Let the output of Algorithm 1 be:
− fault-tolerant graceful program pf ,
− stronger invariant If (in the absence of f ), and
− invariant Igf
Then
1) I ′′ ⊆ I
2) I ′ ⊆ Ig
3) p′ satisfies spec from I”
4) p′ is masking f-tolerant for specr from I’
Proof: The proof is on a case basis.
− I ′′ ⊆ I, p′ | I ′′ ⊆ pg | I ′: This follows from Lines 1, 5,
7-8, as I ′′ can only become smaller than I . Also, since
p′ ⊆ pg and I ′′ ⊆ I ′ (Lines 7 and 8), we have that
p′ | I ′′ ⊆ pg | I ′.
− I ′ ⊆ Ig, p′ | I ′ ⊆ pg | I ′: This follows from the fact that
I ′ = Ig initially and from the properties of Add masking
(Lines 4 and 7).
− p′ satisfies spec from I ′′: It follows from the fact that
I ′′ is closed in p′ (Line 5), I ′′ ⊆ I (1st condition)
and p satisfies spec from I (from problem statement
assumption).
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− p′ is masking f-tolerant for specr from I ′: This follows
from the properties of Add masking (Line 4) and Line
7 (as I ′ gets stronger).
Lemma 4. Let the input to Algorithm 3 be:
− fault-intolerant program p,
− invariant I ,
− spec (original specification),
− graceful program pg ,
− specr (relaxed specification),
− Ig (graceful invariant), and
− fault f
Then, algorithm 3 terminates in polynomial time in state space
of p.
Proof: We need to show that the two loops eventually
terminate. We prove this by showing the existence of a least
fixpoint for both loops.
− Inner loop: We need to show that, for a given
I ′′ and p′′, eventually deadlock(I ′′, p′′) = ∅. When
deadlock(I ′′, p′′) 6= ∅, then I ′′ and p′′ become smaller
(Lines 7 − 10). Eventually, I ′′ = ∅, making p′′ = ∅.
At the next iteration, deadlock(I ′′, p′′) = ∅ and the loop
terminates.
− Outer loop: If the inner loop terminates with I ′′, p′′ =
∅, ∅, then the outer loop will terminate in the next
iteration, since Iold, pold = ∅, ∅, which is equal to the
terminating condition of the outer loop. On the other
hand, if the inner loop terminates with I ′′, p′′ 6= ∅, ∅,
Iold and pold get smaller in the next iteration (Line 3).
Eventually, Iold, pold = ∅, ∅ and the loop terminates.
Theorem 3. Let the input to Algorithm 3 be: (i) fault-
intolerant program p, (ii) invariant I , (iii) spec (original
specification), (iv) graceful program pg , (v) specr (relaxed
specification), (vi) Ig (graceful invariant), and (vii) fault f
Then, Algorithm 3 solves Problem VIII.2 in polynomial time.
Proof: It follows from Lemmas 3 and 4, pf | If ⊆
pg | Igf (since If ⊆ Igf and pf is obtained by removing
transitions from pg) and pf | Igf ⊆ pg | Igf (as pf is smaller
than pg).
A. Case Study (continued): Fault-tolerant Printer System
In this section, we continue with the printer system from
Section V. We consider the fault that dequeues the next task
before the current task is printed. Specifically, the fault action
is represented as follows:
f :: di = 1 ∧ pi = 0 −→ di+1 := 1
Next, we use this fault action along with the original and
graceful program from Section V to generate the fault-tolerant
graceful degradation program: Observe that in this case, the
invariant of the graceful program is closed in the fault actions.
Hence, Add masking can trivially satisfy the fault-tolerance
requirement as no recovery action is needed. And, the actions
of the fault-tolerant graceful-degradation program are the same
as those of the graceful program.
B. Case Study (continued): Resource Constraint Problem
In this section, we extend the cellular network case study
from Section V to make it fault-tolerant. One type of fault that
occurs often is channel loss. The fault action is:
f :: av > 0 −→ av := av − 1
As can be observed, the invariant of the graceful program
is closed in the fault action, meaning that no further action
needs to be added to the graceful program, i.e., the graceful
program can tolerate channel losses.
C. Case Study (continued): Fault-tolerant Byzantine Agree-
ment
As discussed earlier, the fault action relevant for this step is
the one that makes the general process byzantine. We represent
this fault by two actions. First action causes the general to be
byzantine and the second allows it to change its decision.
f :: ∀p ∈ g, i, j, k ¬b.p −→ b.g := true
b.g −→ d.g := 0|1
Based on the constraints of Problem VIII.2, in the con-
text of byzantine agreement, the problem of adding fault-
tolerant graceful-degradation will result in a program that
has the following properties: In the absence of faults, i.e.,
when the general is not byzantine, it will guarantee that
weak validity, weak agreement and Lv are satisfied.
Moreover, in the presence of faults, i.e., when the general is
byzantine, weak agreement will be satisfied and eventu-
ally the program will recover to a state where both weak
agreement and Lv would be satisfied. Observe that taken
together, this ensures that the final program guarantees that if
the general is not byzantine then all non-generals finalize with
a decision that is the same as that of the general. And, if the
general is byzantine, all non-byzantine non-generals finalize
with identical decision. In other words, the fault-tolerant
graceful degradation program satisfies the typical requirements
for byzantine agreement [14].
The graceful program from Section VII did not entirely
handle the read restrictions. Hence, the input program would
remove certain transitions that potentially violate the read
restrictions. Observe that the first action (where process i
changes from ⊥ to d.g) exists in I as well as outside I . Hence,
knowledge of b.g is not needed when executing this action.
Hence, the action corresponding to the group containing
second action must be removed. Likewise, in the third action,
i can change its value to either 0 or 1 only if both d.j and
d.k are different from the general. The fourth action remains
as is. Regarding the fifth action, we observe that if a fault
occurs in a state reached after executing that action then the
corresponding state, where d.g 6= d.i and f.i = 1, is outside
Ig . Since recovery is not possible from this state, this transition
would be removed during addition of fault-tolerance. Finally,
the sixth action remains as is. Thus, the actions of the fault-
tolerant program are as shown in Figure 7. And as discussed
above, it satisfies the requirements of [14]. The program is
also correct even if the third modified action is removed. It is
generated by our program to provide maximal choice to the
designer.
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d.i = ⊥ −→ d.i := d.g
Second action subsumed by the first one.
Third action modified as below
d.i = ⊥ ∧ f.i = 0 ∧ ( (d.j 6= d.g ∧ d.j 6= ⊥)∧
(d.j 6= d.k ∧ d.k 6= ⊥)) −→ d.i := 0|1
d.i 6= ⊥ ∧ f.i = 0 ∧ (d.i = d.j ∨ d.i = d.k) −→ f.i := 1
Fifth action removed
d.i 6= ⊥ ∧ f.i = 0∧
d.j 6= ⊥ ∧ d.i 6= d.j ∧ d.j = d.k −→ d.i := d.j
Fig. 7: Byzantine Agreement: Actions for Fault-tolerant Graceful-
Degradation Program
IX. ADDITION OF FAULT-TOLERANT MULTI-GRACEFUL
DEGRADATION
The problem of graceful degradation focuses on obtaining a
program that satisfies a weakened specification. This concept
can be generalized to a hierarchy of specifications, one weaker
than the previous one. In this section, we generalize our
definitions and algorithms to such multi-graceful degradation.
A. Problem Statement
A multi-graceful degradation program satisfies its original
specification when no fault has occurred. However, if faults
occur then depending upon their severity, it satisfies a weaker
specification. To characterize the severity of faults, a multi-
graceful degradation program identifies a set of faults, say
f1, f2, · · · , fn, such that ∀j : 0 < j < n : fj ⊆ fj+1. Since
fj ⊆ fj+1, fj+1 can perturb the program at least as much
as fj does. Hence, we say that fj+1 is more severe than fj .
In the presence of increasingly severe faults, multi-graceful
degradation program provides successively weaker guarantees.
Hence, it identifies a set of specifications specr0(= spec, the
original specification), specr1 , specr2 , · · · , specrn such that
∀j : 0 ≤ j < n : specrj+1 is weaker than specrj .
Moreover, in the presence of increasingly severe faults, the
program may not recover to its original behavior. Hence,
it identifies a set of state predicates I ′1, I
′
2, · · · I ′n to which
it recovers after the recovery is complete. For each class
of faults, a fault-tolerant multi-graceful degradation program
provides the desired level –masking, failsafe or nonmasking–
of tolerance. However, in this section, we consider masking
fault-tolerance alone. Generalization to other types of fault-
tolerance is straightforward.
To add multi-graceful degradation to a given program p
that satisfies its specification, say spec from invariant, say
I , we need to construct a program pf with invariant If
such that pf satisfies spec from If without using any new
behaviors other than those used by p. However, if faults
occur then it needs to provide appropriate level of tolerance
to them as well as recover to states from where it satisfies
the corresponding weaker specification. Thus, the problem
statement is as follows:
Problem Statement: IX.1
Addition of Fault-Tolerant Multi Graceful-Degradation
Given
◦ p, spec, I , such that p satisfies spec (= specr0 ) from I ,
◦ set of faults, f1, f2, · · · , fn, where
∀j : 0 ≤ j < n : fj ⊆ fj+1,
◦ set of relaxed specifications specr1 , specr2 , · · · , specrn ,
where ∀j : 0 ≤ j < n : specrj+1 is weaker than specrj
Generate a multi-graceful fault-tolerant program pf and
invariant If such that
∃I ′1, I ′2, · · · I ′n where If ⊆ I ′1 ⊆ I ′2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ I ′n
1: If ⊆ I , pf |If ⊆ p|If
2: pf satisfies spec from If
3: pf is masking fi-tolerant to specri from I ′i .
B. Algorithm for Adding Fault-Tolerant multi-graceful degra-
dation
In this section, we introduce the algorithm for adding multi-
graceful degradation in Algorithm 4. Algorithm 4 takes as
input the set of increasingly severe faults and correspondingly
weaker specifications. It also takes in as inputs state predicates
Sa1 , Sa2 , · · · , San . These state predicates capture constraints,
if any, under which the corresponding graceful behavior is
expected. By default, they could be set to Sp − I , i.e., all
states outside the invariant of the original program.
Algorithm 4 considers the faults successively. For fault
class f1, it generates a graceful program satisfying a relaxed
specification specr1 (Line 3). This program preserves all
original behaviors of p and adds new behaviors that satisfy
specr1 . Observe that this can be achieved by Algorithm 1
presented earlier in the paper. After obtaining the graceful
program that satisfies specr1 , we add fault tolerance to f1
(Line 4). This algorithm adds masking tolerance to the input
program. Similar to Algorithm 3, we use a generic algorithm
Add masking to achieve this. This algorithm can be instan-
tiated to be an algorithm from [1], [5], [13].
Finally, this whole process is repeated for each fault-class.
Thus, the algorithm for adding multi-graceful degradation is
as shown in Algorithm 4:
Theorem 4 (Correctness of Algorithm 4). Let the input to
Algorithm 4 be:
− fault-intolerant program p,
− invariant I ,
− state predicates Sa1 , Sa2 , . . . , San ,
− specr1 , specr2 , . . ., specrn
− fault transitions f1, f2 . . . fn,
Let the output of Algorithm 4 be:
− masking fault-tolerant graceful program pf ,
− invariant If
Then
1) If ⊆ I , pf |If ⊆ p|If .
2) pf satisfies spec from If .
3) pf is masking fi-tolerant to specri from Ii.
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Algorithm 4 Adding multi-graceful degradation
Input: fault-intolerant program p, fault-intolerant program invariant I .
state predicates Sa1 , Sa2 , · · · , San
weaker specifications specr1 , specr2 , · · · , specrn .
fault transitions f1, f2, · · · , fn.
Output: masking fault-tolerant program pf , and its invariant If
1: p′′ := p, I ′′ := I
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: pgi, Igi := Gen graceful(Sai,p′′,I ′′ ,specri ) // This function invokes Algorithm 1 .
4: p′, I ′ :=Add masking(pgi,fi, Igi, specri ) // If any of the above two procedures fail, then algorithm aborts and reports
no result returned.
5: p′′ := p′|I ′′, I ′′ := I ′′ ∩ I ′
6: while deadlock(I ′′, p′′) 6= ∅ do
7: I ′ := I ′ − deadlock(I ′′, p′′)
8: I ′′ := I ′′ ∩ I ′
9: p′ := maxp(p′, I ′′, I ′)
10: p′′ := p′|I ′′
11: end while
12: p′′ := p′, I ′′ := I ′
13: end for
14: return p′′ as pf and I ′′ ∩ I as If
Function: maxp(t: transition predicate, S1,S2,· · · :set of state predicates where S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ · · · )
return {(s0, s1)|t ∩ (s0 ∈ S1 ⇒ s1 ∈ S1) ∧ (s0 ∈ S2 ⇒ s1 ∈ S2) ∧ · · · }
Function: deadlock(S: state predicate , t: transition predicate)
return {s0|s0 ∈ S ∧ (∀s1 ∈ S : (s0, s1) /∈ t)}
Proof:
To show Algorithm 4 is sound, we first recall the properties
of Algorithm 1. Let the input to Algorithm 1 be p, its invariant
I , original specification spec and the weaker specification
specr,. Let the output be the graceful program pg and its
invariant Ig . Then, we have:
− pg|I = p|I , I ⊆ Ig .
− pg satisfies specr from Ig .
− pg satisfies spec from I .
Now we use the above three properties to prove this theorem
where we need to show that pf and If satisfy conditions in
Problem Statement IX.1.
− If ⊆ I , pf |If ⊆ p|If .
If ⊆ I follows from Line 14. pf |If ⊆ p|If follows
from Line 4 since it does not add any new transition to
p|If .
− pf satisfies spec from If .
Note that after each iteration (Line 2 to Line 13), p′′
satisfies the specification from invariant generated in
previous steps. It follows from Line 3 that I ′′ is closed
in pgi ; and from Line 4 that I
′′ is closed in p′ since
Add masking does not add any new transition in Igi
as well as in I ′′. In addition, from Line 6 to Line 11, no
new transition is added and deadlock states are resolved.
Hence If is closed in pf . Moreover pf satisfies spec
since If ⊆ I .
− pf is masking fi-tolerant to specri from Ii.
p′′ obtained after each iteration (Line 2 to Line 13)
satisfies specri follows the same proof above. And pf
is masking fi-tolerant is ensured via Add masking.
Theorem 5. Algorithm 4 is polynomial in the size of (|Sp| ∗
n) where Sp is the state space and n the is number of fault
classes.
Proof: The complexity of Algorithm 1 is polynomial in
the size of (|Sp|). If we utilize the Add masking algorithm
from [5] then its complexity is also polynomial in the size of
(|Sp|). Moreover, in Algorithm 4, the outer loop (from Line
2 to Line 13) executes at most n iterations and the inner loop
(from Line 6 to Line 11) executes polynomial times in (|Sp|).
Therefore, the complexity of Algorithm 4 is polynomial in the
size of (|Sp| ∗ n).
X. OHIO COAL RESEARCH CENTER VENTILATION
SYSTEM
In this section, we illustrate Algorithm 4 with a case study
related to Ohio Coal Research Center (OCRC) ventilation
system. The OCRC safety system [15] was designed to protect
personnel and facilities by detecting the presence of explosive
and/or toxic gas and either dealing with it, or by alerting lab
personnel and emergency responders. Our goal in this paper is
to illustrate how (a slightly abstracted version of) this system
can be designed using Algorithm 4.
In OCRC, the facility works with several gases that are
potentially explosive/poisonous in large enough concentration.
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The first line of defense if these gases are released is venti-
lation, i.e., to evacuate any gas before it becomes a hazard.
Ordinarily, ventilation is handled by the building’s central air
supply (see Fig 8) and exhaust, augmented by an exhaust
booster fan. If gas is detected (above a specified threshold),
the lab needs to be isolated from the rest of the building
by closing the exhaust vent cover and then turning off the
booster, and turning on a local exhaust fan that evacuates air
directly outside the building. Depending on the level of gas
concentration, status lights in the lab will change from red
to yellow or red, and a claxon alarm will sound. In addition,
automated phone calls are placed to lab personnel and emails
are sent.
The system needs to tolerate equipment faults. Sensors are
generally duplicated so that failure of one sensor is tolerated,
and relative accuracy can be compared. Hence, failure to detect
the gas is not a concern. However, other parts of the system can
fail. For example, if the central exhaust supply fails, a local
supply fan needs to be turned on. Also, whenever feasible,
isolation is desired so that the released gas does not enter the
rest of the building. However, if the vent cover fails and does
not close then it may be impossible.
Based on the analysis of these faults, in [15], authors have
identified four possible statuses: Safe, NotLocal, UnsafeLab
and UnsafeCentral.
Status Safe corresponds to the case where there is venti-
lation, and the lab is isolated if necessary. Ventilation can
be Central (central exhaust on, vent cover open, booster on)
or Local (vent cover closed and local exhaust on); in both
cases central and/or local supply are on. NotLocal corresponds
to the case where there is ventilation but not isolation; this
means central exhaust is being used. UnsafeLab corresponds
to the case where the lab is isolated although ventilation is
inadequate. UnsafeCentral corresponds to the case where the
lab should be isolated but is not, and ventilation is inadequate.
These form a total order from safest to most hazardous.
To illustrate graceful degradation, we focus on the key
components of ventilation: central supply, central exhaust, vent
cover, local supply and local exhaust. For simplicity, we ignore
the exhaust booster. Specifically, if exhaust booster fails, we
model it as a failure of the central exhaust system. Central
supply and exhaust are not controllable but other compo-
nents are. Controllable components have an actuation status
(open/closed, on/off) and controllability status (controllable or
not). A component is declared uncontrollable if an attempt to
actuate it fails, and it remains uncontrollable until an operator
fixes it and declares it controllable. Controllability lets us know
whether it can be actuated or whether we have to adapt to its
present status.
A. Modeling Ventilation System
Variables.
Based on the assumption made by system designers, ei-
ther central supply or local supply is functioning and it is
acceptable to use either one or both. Moreover, the choice of
supply does not affect the status (Safe, NotLocal, etc.) of the
system. Hence, we only model the central exhaust and local
exhaust system. Hence, we introduce the variable cc (denoting
whether central exhaust is available to use, i.e., it has not been
turned off by building.) and variable lc (denoting whether local
exhaust is available to use, i.e., whether it is controllable). We
also introduce variable c (denoting whether the central exhaust
system is being used by the lab) and variable l (denoting
whether the local exhaust system is being used by the lab).
Likewise, we introduce variables v and vc to denote status
of vent cover and its controllability. Finally, the variable gas
denotes whether hazardous gas exists at a sufficiently high
concentration. Thus, the variables are as follows:
− gas : {0, 1}: Gas hazard detected (gas = 1) or not
(gas = 0).
− vc : {0, 1}: Vent controllable (vc = 1) or not (vc = 0).
− v : {0, 1}: Vent closed (v = 0) or open (v = 1).
− cc : {0, 1}: Central exhaust controllable (cc = 1) or not
(cc = 0).
− c : {0, 1}: Central exhaust in use (c = 1) or not (c = 0).
− lc : {0, 1}: Local exhaust controllable (lc = 1) or not
(lc = 0).
− l : {0, 1}: Local exhaust in use (l = 1) or not (l = 0).
Thus, the state space of this program consists of all states
obtained by assigning each variable value from the domain.
Additionally, when the context is clear, we would use C-style
syntax, that is ¬v evaluating to true if v = 0.
Based on the above modeling, we identify certain structural
constraints. These constraints describe limitations in terms of
transitions that a revised program can include. For example, if
the central exhaust is not controllable then the system cannot
use it by setting c = 1. Observe that this structural constraint
can be modeled as a set of transitions that the program cannot
include. Hence, during the synthesis algorithm, we model it as
(an additional) safety specification that has to be satisfied by
the revised program. The set of (bad) transitions identifying
the structural constraints are given by the following set of
transitions.
Sfbt = {(s0, s1)|(gas(s0) 6= gas(s1)) ∨ (vc(s0) 6= vc(s1))
∨ (cc(s0) 6= cc(s1)) ∨ (lc(s0) 6= lc(s1))}
In addition, the program cannot reach certain states in which
central/local exhaust is uncontrollable (cc = 0, lc = 0) while
it is turned on (c = 1, l = 1). Thus
Sfbs = {s|(¬cc(s) ∧ c(s)) ∨ (¬lc(s) ∧ l(s))}
Notation. We use 〈gas, vc, cc, lc|v, c, l〉 to represent the
state. If a variable value is ‘∗’, it means it can be either 0 or 1.
Thus, 〈1, 1, 1, 1|∗, 0, 1〉 denotes a state where gas is present;
vent cover, central exhaust and local exhaust are controllable;
vent cover may be open or closed, central exhaust is not in
use and local exhaust is in use.
Specification.
There are two major requirements considered critical in the
system design. First of all, when hazardous gas is detected,
the lab should be isolated from the building (denoted as
Riso) to prevent gas leak from the lab to the rest of the
building. Second, the poisonous gas must be exhausted from
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Fig. 8: Overview of OCRC Lab Safety System (from [15])
lab (denoted as Rexh) to outside air. These requirements are
captured by Riso and Rexh, where
− Riso = gas⇒ ¬v, gas isolated.
− Rexh = gas⇒ ((v ∧ c) ∨ l), gas exhausted.
Rexh is considered much more important than Riso since
gases like hydrogen and carbon monoxide can explode. Hence,
we can consider three requirements that are used in describing
the graceful behavior.
− Sf1 = Riso ∧Rexh, where Sf1 is the ideal requirement
that should be satisfied whenever possible. In this state,
any leaked gas is exhausted while isolating the rest
of building from gas. This corresponds to status Safe
described at the beginning of this section.
− Sf2 = Rexh, where Sf2 is desirable when Sf1 cannot
be met, i.e., if isolation cannot occur then exhaust must
be provided. This corresponds to the status NotLocal
described at the beginning of this section.
− Sf3 = Riso∨Rexh, where Sf3 specifies that at least one
of the two requirements should be met. This corresponds
to the status UnsafeLab described at the beginning of this
section.
Remark. For brevity of presentation, we do not model
UnsafeCentral. Modeling UnsafeCentral will require three dif-
ferent levels of graceful degradation. However, our algorithm
can be easily applied in deriving this third level of graceful
degradation.
Original program.
In the ideal scenario, there is no gas leak and at least
one of the exhaust systems is functioning correctly. Moreover,
since no gas is leaked, the vent is always open. For efficiency
reasons, whenever possible, the program chooses the central
exhaust. But it switches to the local exhaust if needed. Thus,
the program consists of three actions. Specifically, the first
action turns on the central exhaust and turns off the local
exhaust when both are available. If only one of the exhaust
is available, the last two actions utilize the corresponding
exhaust. The three actions of the program are as shown in
Table I.
B. Application of Multi-Graceful Degradation in OCRC
In this section, we illustrate Algorithm 4 in the context of
OCRC. First, we discuss the faults in different severity and the
expected requirements in the presence of these faults. Then,
specify corresponding relaxed specifications. In particular, we
split the whole synthesis progress into four parts following
Algorithm 4. In the end, we show the resulting program and
compare it with the original OCRC system design.
1) Faults: Before adding graceful degradation to the pro-
gram in Table I, we identify the faults that may require
one to provide a weaker specification. We consider four
possible faults that affect the system. Of these, the first fault,
f1, corresponds to the case where a gas leak occurs. The
next two faults, f2 and f3, cause the central and the local
exhaust to become uncontrollable. When the exhaust becomes
unavailable/uncontrollable, the system receives a notification
upon which the system must turn the corresponding exhaust
to off. Moreover, it cannot turn that exhaust on again (except
under manual intervention). Note that the assumption in this
system is that both the local and the central exhaust do not
become uncontrollable. This is captured in the modeling of
fault actions f2 and f3. Finally, the last fault action, f4, causes
the vent cover to be uncontrollable. This is a stuck-at fault
that causes the vent to remain in its current position. Its status
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¬gas ∧ lc ∧ cc ∧ (¬c ∨ l) −→ c := 1, l := 0
central exhaust is turned on if both controllable
¬gas ∧ ¬lc ∧ cc ∧ ¬c −→ c := 1
central exhaust is turned on if local exhaust is uncontrollable
¬gas ∧ lc ∧ ¬cc ∧ ¬l −→ l := 1
local exhaust is turned on if central exhaust is uncontrollable
TABLE I: Actions of Fault-intolerant Program p
cannot be changed by the program. These faults are as shown
in Table II.
2) Requirements in the presence of Faults: In this system,
the first graceful program, say pgft1 , is designed for the case
where faults f1 and f2 occur. Observe that in the presence of
f1 and f2, local exhaust and vent cover are still controllable.
Hence, we can eventually ensure both Riso and Rexh. Note
that in the presence of f1 and f2, system may reach states
that violate Sf1 if f1 occurs while the central exhaust is being
used. But all such states are still in Sf2. Hence, the desired
graceful behavior in this context is one that satisfies the safety
specification Sf2 and liveness specification Lv2 := true  
Sf1.
The second graceful program, say pgft2 , is designed for the
case where all four faults can happen. If the local exhaust is
uncontrollable then it would be impossible to satisfy Sf1 when
a gas leak occurs. Likewise, if the vent cover cannot be closed,
it would be impossible to satisfy Sf1. Hence, if the system
is exposed to all four faults, the system may reach states that
violate Sf2. However, all such states still satisfy Sf3. Hence,
the desired graceful behavior in this context is one that satisfies
the safety specification Sf3 and liveness specification Lv2 :=
true Sf2.
Thus, the system design requires us to consider two classes
of faults. The first class includes actions f1 and f2. These
faults are combined into one class since requirements in their
presence are the same. And, the second class includes f1, f2,
f3 and f4.
C. Application of Algorithm 4
First, we identify the inputs for Algorithm 4.
− The fault-intolerant program p is same as that shown in
Table I.
− The invariant I is set of reachable states by p, which in
particular are represented as I = {s|¬gas(s) ∧ (l(s) ∨
(c(s) ∧ v(s)))}
− In this case study, graceful behavior is desired only
if gas is present. Thus the set of state predicates
Sa1, Sa2, · · · , San are all set to {〈1, ∗, ∗, ∗|∗, ∗, ∗〉}.
− Faults are as described in Section X-B1 and the relaxed
specification is as described in Section X-B2.
Recall that Algorithm 4 utilizes a multi-step approach where
in each step, one class of faults is considered. The Algorithm
4 invokes Algorithm 1 on Line 3. This subroutine expands the
behavior of the original program to add new behaviors that
only satisfy the weaker specification. Subsequently, it utilizes
this program to add fault-tolerance in Line 4. Thus, for ease
of understanding, we partition the application of Algorithm 4
into four parts, given below:
Part 1. (Line 3 in first iteration of loop 2-13): Generate
graceful program pg1 , such that it satisfies safety specification
Sf2 and liveness specification Lv2 := true Sf1.
Part 2. (Line 4 in first iteration of loop 2-13): Add fault-
tolerance to pg1 to obtain pgft1 .
Part 3. (Line 3 in second iteration of loop 2-13): Generate
graceful program pg2 , such that it satisfies safety specification
Sf3 and liveness specification Lv3 := true Sf2.
Part 4. (Line 4 in second iteration of loop 2-13): Add fault-
tolerance to pg2 to obtain pgft2 .
Part 1: Generation of Graceful Program pg1 .
To generate pg1 (on Line 3 of Algorithm 4), we invoke
procedure Gen graceful. Based on the inputs to Algorithm
4, the inputs to the algorithm are as follows.
− Sa: As mentioned, Sa1 = {〈1, ∗, ∗, ∗|∗, ∗, ∗〉}.
− p: In the first iteration (2-13), the program transitions
for gen graceful is the fault-intolerant program p.
− I: Same as the invariant identified for fault-intolerant
program.
− specr1 : The relaxed specification is a pair of safety
specification and liveness specification.
– Relaxed Safety: We specify safety specification as
the set of bad states and bad transitions. First of
all, we require that program always satisfies Sf2,
thus states in ¬Sf2 are not allowed. In addition, the
relaxed safety specification should always contain
structural constraints Sfbs and Sfbt.
– Relaxed Liveness: We require program ensure both
exhaustion and isolation eventually, i.e. reach a state
satisfying Sf1.
Hence specr1 := 〈(¬Sf2 ∪ Sfbs, Sfbt), true Sf1〉.
First on Line 1, we identify all the states in Sa satisfying
Sfrbs . These states are denoted as I∆ := ((v = 1 ∧ c =
1)∨(l = 1))∧(cc = 0→ c = 0)∧(lc = 0→ l = 0). Then, I ′
includes all states in I and I∆. On Line 3, we obtain the set
of transitions satisfying the safety specification. In particular,
we show all the transitions in Figure 9 (including solid and
dashed arrow). Note that on Line 3, each state in I∆ is added
with a self-loop transition. Now we discuss the synthesis by
loop (from Line 4 to Line 13) in different iterations.
− Iteration #1: By construction I only includes states
where no hazardous gas is present and I∆ only includes
states where hazardous gas is present. The program
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f1: ¬gas −→ gas := 1 hazardous gas is detected
f2: cc ∧ lc −→ cc := 0, l := 1, c := 0 central exhaust loses its control
f3: cc ∧ lc −→ lc := 0, l := 0, c := 1 local exhaust is loses its control
f4: vc −→ vc := 0 vent cover loses its control
TABLE II: Faults
cannot write the variable gas. Hence no transition from
I∆ to I is added on Line 7. There is no deadlock state
identified in this iteration on Line 8. To realize the effect
of Line 11, we first assign the rank (using function
rank) over each state. According to Lv, states in Sf1
are assigned rank 0. Since both states 〈1, 1, 1, 1|1, 1, 1〉
and 〈1, 1, 1, 1|1, 0, 1〉 reach some states in Sf1 in one
step, their ranks are 1. Therefore, the transition between
them is removed on Line 11. Likewise, on Line 11,
the self-loop transitions on states 〈1, 1, 1, 1|1, 1, 0〉,
〈1, 1, 1, 1|1, 1, 1〉, 〈1, 1, 1, 1|1, 0, 1〉 and 〈1, 1, 0, 1|1, 0, 1〉
are removed. On Line 12, those states with ranks of ∞
are removed, i.e. those underlined states in Figure 9.
− Iteration #2: Algorithm 1 applies no change in the next
iteration, thus the loop terminates.
Therefore the remaining transitions (and states) together
with those in p (and in I) are returned as pg1 (and Ig1 ). We
show transitions of pg1 (except those shown in Table I) in
Figure 9.
Part 2: Adding Fault-tolerance to pg1 .
To add fault-tolerance, we use procedure Add masking
as a black box. Thus to illustrate the result of adding fault-
tolerance, we first consider how the program can be perturbed
by faults, that is set of reachable states by pg1 in the presence
of f , where f = f1 ∪ f2; then show that starting from all
these reachable states there are transitions provided by either
original program p or graceful program pg1 .
In the absence of faults, if only f1 occurs, the system
reaches one of the states in 〈1, 1, 1, 1|∗, ∗, ∗〉. Note that all
these states are generated in pg1 and have outgoing transition,
thus f1 is tolerated. In the absence of faults, if only f2 occurs,
following transitions in p, system switches to local exhaust,
thus f2 is tolerated. If original program perturbed by f1 and f2
together, the only state can be perturbed to is 〈1, 1, 0, 1|1, 0, 1〉
which is generated in pg1 and has an outgoing transition. Thus,
there is no changes on Line 4 in Algorithm 4.
Part 3: Generation of Graceful Program pg2 .
In this case, we add fault-tolerance to the program generated
in Part 2. The inputs of program and invariant are selected from
the first iteration. Faults consist of all four faults in Table II
and the specification in the presence of faults is as specified
in Section X-B2.
We do not elaborate the effect of Algorithm 1 again on pg2 .
Instead, we show set of newly discovered transitions and states
in pg2 (not including those in pg1 ) in Table III.
Part 4: Adding Fault-tolerance to pg2 . There are no new
transitions added by Add masking, and pgft2 is same as pg2 .
D. Extension to deal with UnsafeCentral
To finalize the synthesis, we also consider the status of Un-
safeCentral. In this case, neither isolation nor exhaust may be
satisfied, at least temporarily. Hence, the relaxed requirement
does not include any safety specification. However, it includes
a liveness specification, namely, true  Sf3. Although we
do not present the application of Algorithm 4, we can easily
obtain the corresponding program by considering only another
class of faults and applying Algorithm 4 in a third iteration.
The state where Sf3 is violated is reached due to faults such
as transients. It could also be reached if both exhaust systems
fail temporarily. Algorithm 4 already handles this scenario as
well. Specifically, for this case, we need to model fault f5 as a
transient fault that requires the liveness specification true  
Sf3. If we add this as the third fault class and apply Algorithm
4, the resulting program is same as the ventilation system (i.e.,
the system except alarms, status lights etc) of OCRC.
XI. RELATED WORK
The work in this paper is closely related to that of con-
troller synthesis, game theory and automated addition of
fault-tolerance. Controller synthesis considers the following
problem: Given two languages U (plant) and D (desired
system), identify a third language C (controller), such that
U ∩ D ⊆ C [16]. Thus, the goal is to begin with the plant
and add controller to obtain the desired system. The idea
of transforming a fault-intolerant system into a fault-tolerant
system using controller synthesis is used in [17]. Also in [18],
Girault and Rutten demonstrate the application of discrete
controller synthesis in automated addition of fault-tolerance in
the context of untimed systems. Our work in this paper differs
from this work in that we are trying to relax the specification
of the given system whereas they are trying to strengthen
it. In the context of game theoretical approach for model
revision, a program is automatically fixed as a game [19],
[20]. The game is played on the model of two players [21],
i.e., program and environment. A program is considered to win
the game if the specification is always satisfied no matter how
the environment interacts with the program. Game theoretic
methods are usually based on the theory of tree automata [22].
Model repair for probabilistic system [3] is to revise a
probabilistic system M such that the new system M ′ satisfies
a probabilistic temporal logic formula. M ′ differs from M
only in the transition flows of controllable states. Our work
is orthogonal to that in [3] in that this work can be extended
in the context of dealing with probabilities and their work
can be extended to deal with addition of graceful degradation.
Algorithms for automatic addition of fault-tolerance [1], [5]
add fault-tolerance concerns to existing untimed or real-time
programs in the presence of faults, and guarantee the addition
of no new behaviors to the original program in the absence
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1, 1, 1, 1|1, 1, 0 1, 1, 1, 1|1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1, 1|1, 0, 1
1, 1, 1, 1|0, 1, 1 1, 1, 1, 1|0, 0, 1
1, 1, 0, 1|1, 0, 1 1, 1, 0, 1|0, 0, 1
1, 0, 1, 1|0, 1, 1 1, 0, 1, 1|0, 0, 1
1, 0, 1, 1|1, 1, 0 1, 0, 1, 1|1, 1, 1 1, 0, 1, 1|1, 0, 1
1, 0, 1, 0|1, 1, 0 1, 1, 1, 0|1, 1, 0 1, 0, 0, 1|1, 0, 1
1, 0, 0, 1|0, 0, 1
Sf2
Sf1
gas, vc, cc, lc|v, c, l
: state
gas, vc, cc, lc|v, c, l
: removed state
: program transition
: removed transition
Fig. 9: Transitions of pg1 (except those shown in Table I)
〈1, 0, 1, 1|0, 1, 0〉 → 〈1, 0, 1, 1|0, 1, 1〉 〈1, 0, 0, 1|0, 0, 0〉 → 〈1, 0, 0, 1|0, 0, 1〉
〈1, 0, 1, 1|0, 0, 0〉 → 〈1, 0, 1, 1|0, 0, 1〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0|0, 1, 0〉 → 〈1, 1, 1, 0|1, 1, 0〉
〈1, 1, 0, 1|0, 0, 1〉 → 〈1, 1, 0, 1|0, 0, 1〉 〈1, 1, 1, 1|0, 0, 0〉 → 〈1, 1, 1, 1|0, 0, 1〉
〈1, 1, 1, 1|0, 1, 0〉 → 〈1, 1, 1, 1|0, 1, 1〉 〈1, 1, 1, 0|0, 0, 0〉 → 〈1, 1, 1, 0|0, 1, 0〉
TABLE III: Newly discovered transitions in Part 3
of faults. In the context of this paper, we utilize the synthesis
algorithm for adding fault-tolerance. Our work builds on this
work by enabling repair in scenarios where the previous work
fails to perform repair or has a much higher overhead.
XII. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
A. Discussion
Order of Operations in Different Phases. In our
approach, we first designed a program that satisfied degraded
specification. Subsequently, we added fault-tolerance to the
resulting program. A natural question, thus, is whether it would
be possible to add fault-tolerance as the first step. We argue
that this is not possible. In particular, the main reason for using
the approach in this paper is for cases where it is impossible
for the fault-tolerant program to recover to states from where
the original specification is satisfied.
Comparison with Algorithms for Adding Safety, Live-
ness or Fault-tolerance. Existing work [5], [13], [23]
focuses on adding properties to an existing program. Since
the goal of this work is to construct a program that preserves
the existing specification (in the absence of faults) and to
satisfy the newly desired property, they prohibit transitions
to be added in the absence of faults. This is due to the fact
that adding transitions creates new program behaviors that
may not satisfy the original (universal) specification. However,
these approaches permit removal of transitions, as removal of
transitions preserves existing universal specification as long
as it does not create deadlocks. Our solution in Algorithm
1 is explicitly designed to add such transitions so that the
new program satisfies a relaxed specification. For this reason,
the algorithms in this paper are more general than that in [5],
[13], [23]. Specifically, the algorithm in this paper is applicable
even if it is impossible to recover the system to states from
where the original specification is satisfied. By contrast, the
algorithms in [5], [13], [23] will declare failure in these cases.
Scalability of Approach. State space explosion is generally
unavoidable in the area of program verification or synthesis.
Even though the addition of fault tolerance (FT) is NP-
complete in the size of the state space, it has been shown
to be feasible to add FT to programs of moderate size [24],
up to programs with state space of 10100 [25]. However, the
approach may not directly scale to C++ programs of 1000s of
lines of code. One possible way to circumvent this is through
model extraction. In [26], we have extracted the necessary state
transition model from a UML model, apply fault tolerance
transformation to it and convert it back (with some heuristics)
to a UML model. In [27], the authors have shown how an
UPPAAL model can be extracted from a SystemC model (an
extension of C). We have shown how FT can be added to
these models [28] and how it can be sliced to find subset of
the model relevant to the property at hand. In this context,
automated reverse transformation is not yet available.
Transformation Failure. Our algorithm involves 2 steps:
(i) Addition of graceful behavior and (ii) addition of fault-
tolerance. Technically, the first step cannot fail. It can simply
return the original program, i.e., it may not add any new behav-
iors. This may, however, cause the second step to fail. Adding
fault-tolerance fails for two reasons: (1) it is impossible to
satisfy the property or (2) heuristics used for adding fault-
tolerance fails. For high atomicity programs –where a process
can read all the variables–, the algorithms for adding fault-
tolerance are sound and complete, i.e., they declare failure
only if a solution is not feasible. For distributed programs,
the problem of adding fault-tolerance is NP-complete. Hence,
heuristic based approaches have been developed for adding
fault-tolerance in distributed systems.
Implication to Concrete Programs. Our work focuses on
event based programs where each process consists of several
event processing modules that responds to events (that may
correspond to external events or internal events indicating
that certain predicate is true). In this case, adding behaviors
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corresponds to adding new modules for dealing with newer
predicates. By contrast, removing behaviors corresponds to
restricting ore removing existing event response modules.
An alternate approach is to utilize ideas such as recovery
blocks [29]. Specifically, in this approach, at certain instances
of the program, acceptance conditions are checked. If they are
violated, alternate code is executed to recover from the result-
ing faults/errors. New behaviors can be added by adding such
recovery blocks. Also, in [30], authors present an approach
to utilize concurrent atomic actions (that are the basis of our
model) instead of recovery blocks.
Interference Among Properties. In our case study on
multi-graceful degradation, we assumed that the specifications
were in a strict order, with the original specification being
strongest, the next one weaker and so on. This allowed us to
handle the stepwise addition where we consider one specifi-
cation at a time. It is possible to consider a version where
you have incompatible weaker specifications. For example,
one specification could be to satisfy requirement 1 alone but
not necessarily requirement 2. Another specification could
be to satisfy requirement 2 but not necessarily requirement
1. We believe that designing graceful degradation in this
manner is expected to be more difficult. We anticipate it
being NP-complete based on a result in [31]. In this work,
authors have considered adding failsafe and nonmasking fault-
tolerance. They are similar to incompatible requirements. We
anticipate that such scenarios are generally rare; in most cases,
requirements can be characterized in terms of their priority
and the desired graceful behaviors require that highest priority
requirements should be satisfied. Hence, the graceful behaviors
naturally fall into (1) drop 1 requirement with lowest priority,
(2) drop 2 requirements with lowest priority and so on.
B. Conclusion
Existing approaches for automated addition of fault-
tolerance have focused on the following problem: Given a
fault-intolerant program p, construct a fault-tolerant program
p′ such that p′ behaves like p after recovery from faults. It
follows that after recovery is complete, p′ satisfies the original
specification of p. However, as discussed in the paper, there
are several instances where it is impossible (or undesirable)
to recover the system to states from where the original
specification is satisfied. Hence, we focused on the problem
of graceful fault-tolerance, where the goal is to construct a
program p′ such that (1) in the absence of faults p′ behaves
like p, (2) p′ provides desired fault-tolerance, and (3) after
recovery is complete, p′ exhibits graceful behavior where it
satisfies the given weaker specification.
We presented a two-phase approach for designing graceful
fault-tolerance: In the first phase, we transformed the input
fault-intolerant program p into a graceful program pg that
includes all behaviors of p as well as new behaviors that
satisfy the desired weaker specification. In the second phase,
we used both p and pg to obtain a fault-tolerant program p′
that behaves like p in the absence of faults and recovers to
behaviors provided by pg after the faults stop.
To solve this problem, we have first formalized the problem
of adding graceful degradation to a program and have then
provided an algorithm that transforms a given fault-intolerant
program into a gracefully degrading program. We presented
two solutions, one for concurrent programs and another for
distributed programs where each process can read or write only
a subset of program variables. For the second phase, we have
formulated the problem of addition of fault-tolerance where
one begins with two (or possibly more) programs that satisfy
successively weaker specifications.
We have then demonstrated the applicability of our algo-
rithms through three case studies: (i) a printer system [4], (ii)
cellular networks [11] and (iii) Byzantine agreement. Of these,
if we used the first two case studies with existing approaches
[23] then they will declare failure since there does not exist a
fault-tolerant program that satisfies the original specification.
And, for the third case study, a significantly more complex
input is required to permit addition of fault-tolerance.
We have then extended the notion of graceful degradation
to that of multi-graceful degradation whereby a program can
satisfy some weaker specification based on the severity of the
fault type being present. Similarly, we have first formalised
the problem and provided a polynomial-time algorithm that
automates the addition of multi-graceful degradation. We have
shown the applicability of the algorithm on a non-trivial case
study, namely the OCRC system.
Our approach for designing graceful programs also opens up
new research directions in the area of program repair, where
the goal is to add a desired property (safety, liveness, fault-
tolerance, etc.) to a given program. However, these approaches
fail if the newly desired property is incompatible (e.g., adding
priorities to programs that assume equal fairness) with an
existing property of the program.
For example, consider the case where we have a program
that provides fair mutual exclusion access to processes P1 and
P2. Suppose we want to add the property that requires that
P1 has higher priority than P2. Since the new requirement
is incompatible with existing program properties, existing
approaches that add a new property while preserving existing
universal properties fails. In these cases, our first phase can be
used to remove ‘fairness’ from the given program so that the
priority requirement can be added. Thus, novel algorithms to
add new properties to an existing program after removing the
offending property are required.
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